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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A cap-and-trade program is likely to be a centerpiece of federal 
climate-change legislation.1  The presence of a national market does not, 
however, render irrelevant the states’ vital interest in the goals and 
operation of a national trading program.  An effective climate-change 
trading program is likely to have profound impacts on our industrial 
economy and, as a consequence, will present complex political, 
economic, and environmental issues that are of as much interest at the 
state as the federal level.2  The issue of who—federal or state actors—
should control key parameters within a cap-and-trade program is 
contested in current debates about federal climate-change legislation.3  
 1. A recent  federal legis lative proposal calls for a cap-and-trade p rogram 
t o control stationary source and transportation emissions.  See generally American Clean 
Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 301-360, available at 
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h2454/text. That bill narrowly passed the House 
in June 2009.  Carolyn Lochhead, Landmark Climate Bill Squeaks Through, S.F. CHRON., 
June 27, 2009, at A1. Similar legislation is under consideration in the Senate.  See Dina 
Cappiello, EPA to Crack Down on Greenhouse Gas Emitters, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 1, 2009, 
A1. President Obama is likely to support such cap-and-trade legislation. See John M. 
Broder, Setting “Green” Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at A1. 
 2. See generally Timothy Heinmiller, The Politics of “Cap and Trade” Policies, 
47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 445 (2007).  Recognizing the complexity added by political 
debates, Professor Heinmiller argues that the “politics of cap-and-trade policies are a 
reality that needs to be recognized and understood rather than lamented by social 
scientists.” Id. at 449.  See also id. at 464 (observing that “the trading of resource rights 
is not simply a market transaction but a socio-economic reshaping of resource dependent 
industries and communities”). 
 3. See the Introduction in Victor Flatt’s article in this issue of the San Diego 
Journal of Climate & Energy Law; STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION DESIGN WHITE PAPER: APPROPRIATE ROLES FOR 
DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT (2008) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER], available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/images/stories/Documents/PDF/selected_legislation/w
hite%20paper%20st-lcl%20roles%20final%202-22.pdf.  An early draft of cap-and-trade 
legislation for the electricity sector preempted state regulation of the sector. See J.R. 
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Should federal law preempt state control over a trading system, so that 
only the federal government makes key determinations?  Or should 
federal law allow states to exert at least some control within a federal 
program? 
If a federal cap-and-trade program preempts states’ roles in a trading 
system, that preemption could have a substantial impact on the states’ 
ability to address climate change.4  To be sure, federal legislation is likely to 
leave considerable scope for state control in areas like land use.5  Federal 
legislation might also provide states with indirect control over emissions 
from electricity-generating sources if federal legislation allows states to 
continue to implement a variety of energy policies, including renewable 
portfolio standards, energy efficiency programs, and other demand-
reduction initiatives.6  But direct control over stationary-source emissions in 
both the electricity and industrial sectors is likely to remain an important 
lever in achieving greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction goals.7  If federal 
legislation imposing a cap-and-trade program on direct stationary-source 
DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate 
Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1536 n.135 (2007).  Legislation under consideration at 
the time of this writing provides a relatively wide scope for state control, as discussed 
further below.   See infra note 92 and accompanying text.  See generally American Clean 
Energy and Security Act §§ 301-360. 
 4. See Part II(B) of William W. Buzbee’s article in this issue of the San Diego 
Journal of Climate & Energy Law. 
 5. WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 2, 7; American Clean Energy and Security Act 
§ 222 (amending Title VIII of the Clean Air Act to require regional metropolitan 
planning organizations to develop greenhouse gas reduction targets and implementation 
strategies). 
 6. Renewable portfolio standards, which promote alternative energy, and demand- 
reduction measures, which promote conservation and energy efficiency, reduce the need 
for carbon-based electricity and thereby provide an indirect mechanism for reducing 
emissions from electricity-generating units.  Many states are, or could, pursue these 
strategies. See, e.g., FRANZ T. LITZ, TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE ON FEDERAL 
AND STATE ROLES IN U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY  8, 14-15 (Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change 2008), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/StateFedRoles.pdf; Thomas 
A. Peterson et al., Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change Policy in 
the United States that Fully Integrates Levels of Government and Economic Sectors, 26 
VA. ENVTL. L.J.  227, 239 (2008) (observing that energy efficiency, conservation, and 
renewable energy  are key areas  for state action). T he federal legis lat ion under 
consideration at the time of this writing creates a federal renewable energy requirement 
but does not preempt a state’s ability to establish a more stringent requirement than the 
federal standard. American Clean Energy and Security Act § 101 (amending Title VI of 
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978). Although the federal legislation 
provides for an increased federal role by requiring states to adopt more stringent building 
codes, actual control will remain at the state level, and states retain the power to be more 
stringent than the federal minimum. American Clean Energy and Security Act § 201 
(amending Energy Conservation and Production Act § 304(c)). 
 7. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, in 2007, 34% of U.S. 
GHG emissions came from electricity generation and 20% came from industrial sources. 
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emissions preempts state control over the covered sources, that preemption 
would significantly impact the scope of state climate policies and their 
capacity to regulate the facilities within their jurisdictions. 
At the same time, state initiatives could have national consequences in 
light of the interconnections created by a national trading market, the 
lack of uniformity generated by divergent state approaches, and the 
duplicative administrative resources devoted to regulatory programs at 
both the federal and state levels.  Determining the appropriate balance 
between the potential benefits and detrimental impacts of allowing state 
control poses a significant challenge. 
This Article addresses a critical question about a state’s role in the 
operation of a national cap-and-trade program: whether federal legislation 
should allow states to be more stringent than the federal government.8  
Numerous scholars have articulated compelling justifications for 
allowing states to be more stringent than the federal government.9  This 
Article takes the next step: it not only reviews these justifications but 
also assesses particular mechanisms for achieving state stringency and 
evaluates their potential negative consequences in order to provide a 
more nuanced assessment of the wisdom of state stringency.  I argue that 
allowing states to achieve greater stringency is justified notwithstanding 
certain negative consequences, particularly since the states are unlikely 
to impose more stringent targets (and risk negative consequences) unless 
the federal program is inadequate.  In addition, the analysis of differing 
 8. Certain complications could arise in determining stringency.  Here, I refer only 
to the absolute number of allowances required.  A key issue, however, is the extent to 
which the trading system permits the use of not only allowances representing emissions 
within the covered sectors but also the use of offsets that come from abroad or for 
domestic sources that are not covered by the trading system. An unanswered question is 
whether a state program that imposed a more lenient annual cap, but limited offset use, is 
more or less stringent than a federal cap that allows extensive use of offsets. 
 9. See generally William L. Andreen, Federal Climate Change Legislation and 
Preemption, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L & POL’Y J. 261 (2008); WILLIAM ANDREEN ET AL., 
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND CLIMATE CHANGE: WHY FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS M UST CONTINUE TO PARTNER (Center for Progressive Reform 2008), 
available at http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/federalismClimateChange.pdf; 
Buz bee, supra note 4, at  Part II(B); Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy , A 
Collectiv e Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental 
Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U.L. REV. 579, 604 (2008); 
Flatt, supra note 3, at Part VI; Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global 
Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681 (2008); cf. 
William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling 
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007) (arguing that federal legislation should 
generally allow states to be more, but not less, stringent than federal standards). 
 107 
 
KASWAN (DO NOT DELETE)  2/15/2016  9:14 AM 
 
mechanisms’ varying impacts should assist decision-makers considering 
alternative policy designs. 
This Article is the first in a series that will address the wisdom 
of allowing state control within a federal trading system. Subsequent 
scholarship will address trading policies more generally, including the 
extent to which federal legislation should allow states to impose direct 
facility regulations, differing offset requirements, or trading restrictions 
to achieve potential economic and environmental co-benefits.10  Subsequent 
scholarship will also address allowance distribution11—namely, whether 
the federal government or the states should control the distribution of 
federal allowances, an issue with substantial political and economic 
implications. 
Part II of this Article articulates the primary justifications for allowing 
states to set more stringent caps. The first is the national importance of 
creating a safety net in the not-unlikely event of current or future federal 
failure. The second is grounded in democratic theory: the states’ 
democratic prerogative to address climate-change and control emissions 
from in-state sources. 
Part III turns to practical mechanisms to achieve state stringency.  It 
first observes that, in a national trading program, states cannot achieve 
stringency without the capacity to retire the allowances associated with 
their additional reductions.  Since one cannot identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of letting states set caps and retire allowances without 
evaluating the practical consequences of different forms of achieving 
stringency, Part III describes the range of mechanisms through which 
states could both reduce emissions and retire the associated allowances.  
The mechanisms states could use to achieve stringency will depend upon 
the powers granted the states by federal legislation.  Part III therefore 
describes a set of possible decentralization options and the mechanisms 
that states could use to achieve stringency within each model. 
Part IV articulates the potential adverse impacts that could result from 
states using these mechanisms to achieve more stringent goals.  It 
considers potential impacts on the national allowance market, negative 
impacts on out-of-state consumers, uniformity, and administrative 
efficiency considerations. 
 10. Alice Kaswan, Decentralizing Cap-and-Trade? The Question of State Trading 
Controls within a Federal Cap-and-Trade Program, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 
2010). 
 11. In a federal cap-and-trade program, the federal government would set a yearly 
cap on emissions from the sectors covered by the program.  The government would then 
allocate the allowances associated with the cap, with each allowance representing a right 
to emit a certain quantity of GHGs. 
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Part V concludes that, on balance, state stringency is justified.  The 
benefits of creating a safety net and the democratic goals served by 
allowing state stringency are highly compelling.  And while the adverse 
impacts present cause for concern, they are relatively unlikely to occur 
given the extensive collective action impediments to states establishing 
more stringent objectives.  States are likely to set more stringent targets 
only when the federal goal is blatantly inadequate, precisely the scenario 
in which state action is most justified. Considering the potential adverse 
impacts on the merits, Part V concludes that potential external impacts 
on the national allowance market are the most serious prospective 
consequence and an important factor in developing options for achieving 
stringency.  Nonetheless, some impact on the national allowance market 
is acceptable in light of the significant benefits of state action.  Potential 
impacts on out-of-state consumers, uniformity, and administrative 
efficiency are long-accepted costs of a federal system that respects the 
inherent value of state sovereignty, and therefore present less cause for 
concern. 
Part VI briefly articulates some of the implications of the foregoing 
analysis for federal legislation.  While it does not recommend either a 
particular mechanism for achieving stringency or a particular decentralization 
model, it makes clear that federal legislation must explicitly delineate 
the contours of state power in order to enable states to exercise 
autonomy free from the threat of legal challenges. 
Before turning to the Article’s primary arguments, I first articulate 
several preliminary assumptions.  This Article does not contemplate a 
purely decentralized approach that would rely solely upon state or 
regional action.  While many states have initiated state and regional 
efforts to combat climate change, those efforts cannot substitute for a 
federal program.12  The Article assumes a federal cap-and-trade program 
with trading in federal allowances. 
The Article addresses only a potential “downstream” cap-and-trade 
program focused on stationary sources—a program that would impose 
allowance requirements on the actual emitters of GHGs.  It does not 
address an “upstream” program that would impose requirements on 
entities like oil producers, mining companies, the transportation sector, 
 12. See Kirsten H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives and State and Local 
Climate Change Initiatives, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 119, 135-36 (2008); Alice Kaswan, A 
Cooperative Federalism Proposal for Climate Change Legislation: The Value of State 
Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 791, 794-97 (2008). 
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or other entities that are upstream from, and do not directly cause, 
emissions.13 
The Article also focuses on the wisdom of designing federal legislation to 
incorporate state control, not judicial standards for determining whether 
and to what degree federal legislation, once designed, preempts state 
action.14 
II.  THE BENEFITS OF ALLOWING STATES TO SET                                             
MORE STRINGENT CAPS 
A. The Nature and Significance of the Caps 
A trading program’s stringency is fundamental to achieving 
environmental goals and to the overall effectiveness of a trading 
program.15  Climate policies typically embody two types of caps, both of 
which play a crucial role.  The first type of cap is characterized by 
overarching long-term, economy-wide goals.  Such goals are often 
established as a percentage reduction from a given baseline year by a 
certain date, like 20% below 2005 levels by 2020.16  The economy-wide 
goals in recent legislative proposals reflect the share of global reductions 
that the jurisdiction is politically willing to accept, a judgment rooted in 
a complex web of environmental and economic considerations. 
Implementing a GHG trading program requires a second step: 
translating the general goals into yearly emissions allocations for the 
 13. See Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address 
Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2008) (proposing upstream cap-and-
trade program); David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument: Dirty Input 
Limits, 33 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 65 (2009).  Nor does the Article address the potential 
interrelationship between upstream and downstream controls, whether imposed at the federal 
or state levels.  While upstream controls may ultimately present a useful complement or 
alternative to downstream requirements, such controls, and the relative role of the federal 
government and the states in imposing them, raise issues that are beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
 14. For analy ses  of how t he court s  should evaluat e a fut ure conflict  
bet ween federal climate-change law and state initiatives, see, for example, Buzbee, 
supra note 4; Dan Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 879 (2008); Glicksman & Levy, supra note 9; Alexandra B. Klass, State 
Innovation and Preemption: Lessons from State Climate Change Efforts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1653 (2008); cf. James R. May, Of Happy Incidents, Climate, Federalism, and 
Preemption, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 465 (2008) (addressing preemption of 
state law under the existing Clean Air Act). 
 15. See generally Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-And-
Trade: Moving Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395 (2009). 
 16. For example, the Waxman-Markey legislation establishes the goal of reducing 
emissions by 20% below 2005 levels by 2020 and by 83% by 2050, with a number of 
interim goals. American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 311 
(2009) (establishing Title VII, section 702). 
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covered sectors.17 By specifying the number of allowances to be 
distributed to facilities in the program each year, the yearly emissions 
allocations function as a kind of cap for the covered sectors.18  These 
yearly “caps” determine the proportion of the overall emissions 
reduction goal to be achieved (or at least financed) by the covered 
facilities rather than by sources that are not covered by the cap-and-trade 
program.19  The yearly caps are critical to the achievement of actual 
emissions reductions in any given year.  If the yearly cap is higher than 
actual existing emissions from covered facilities, so that facilities receive 
more allowances than they need, then the facilities are unlikely to reduce 
emissions.  Even if the cap is below existing emissions, its stringency is 
critical to whether facilities will be motivated to make reasonably 
achievable reductions.20 
The yearly allowance allocations also dictate the pace at which the 
overarching economy-wide goals will be reached.  Policymakers could 
require the same percentage reduction in allowance allocations each 
 17. See, e.g., id. (establishing Title VII, section 721, which dictates the number of 
allowances to be issued each year of the cap-and-trade program). Prior trading programs 
for traditional pollutants have generally had only one cap: the emissions-reduction goals 
for the regulated sectors have translated directly into the annual caps for those sectors.  
For example, in the Acid Rain Program, the caps for the program’s two phases were 
simply based upon achieving a certain level of reduction from the facilities covered in 
each phase of the program.  See McAllister, supra note 15, at 399-400. 
 18. The yearly allocation numbers constitute only a “quasi-cap.” If the trading 
program permits the use of offsets, then the yearly allowance allocation does not function as a 
true cap.  A covered entity that purchased offsets from reductions (or sequestration) 
outside of the covered sector would be able to use offsets, not just the initially allocated 
allowances, to cover its emissions.  Although properly implemented offsets could generate 
real reductions, they allow emissions within the covered sector to exceed the yearly allowance 
allocation. 
 19. Assume, for example, that a program sought to reduce all emissions  t o 
1 million tons per year by 2015.  Assume further that the sectors covered by the cap-and-
t rade p rogram constituted 80% of t he nation’s emissions, while 20% came from 
“uncovered” sources like small facilities and agricultural practices.  If the jurisdiction 
wanted to concentrate reductions in the covered sectors, it could limit the number of 
emission allowances for the covered sectors to 750,000, effectively requiring greater reductions 
from the covered sectors. The fact that the covered sectors would be responsible for 
reducing emissions to 750,000 tons does not, however, necessarily mean that all the 
reductions would, in fact, occur within the covered sectors.  While only 750,000 allowances 
would be distributed, if facilities in the covered sectors are permitted to purchase offsets, 
they could purchase reductions from outside the covered sectors to legitimate additional 
emissions. See supra note 18 (discussing impact of offsets on yearly allowance allocations to 
covered sectors). 
 20. See McAllister, supra note 15, at 401-03 (describing failure to achieve feasible 
reductions in the Acid Rain Program due to an insufficiently stringent cap). 
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year, intensify required reductions as the long-term goals approach, or 
concentrate reductions in the early years of the program. The pace of 
reductions established by the yearly caps is environmentally significant 
because earlier reductions have greater climate-change benefits given the 
longevity of GHG emissions in the atmosphere.21 
Economy-wide goals and annual allowance allocations are economically 
as well as environmentally significant.  The pace of reductions and the 
relationship of a yearly cap to that year’s actual emissions could 
significantly affect the short- and long-term costs of coping with climate 
change.22  The potential economic impact of climate-change policies has 
been a significant issue in recent policy debates.23  Further, the timing of 
the reductions also has economic implications given the long-term 
investments associated with energy infrastructure.24  Thus, both the 
stringency of the long-term goals and the pace at which they are attained 
present critical environmental and economic issues. 
B. State Stringency as a Safety Net 
As many scholars have noted, a fundamental justification for allowing 
overlapping jurisdiction—for allowing states as well as the federal 
government to set emission reduction targets—is that the states can 
function as a safety net if the federal program proves inadequate.25  If 
 21. See Richard J . Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems  and Climate Change: 
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1164-68 
(2009).  The IPCC, in its most recent report, emphasized the importance of near-term reductions 
and noted that “[d]elayed emission reductions significantly constrain the opportunities to 
achieve lower stabilization levels and increase the risk of more severe climate-change 
impacts.” INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
SYNTHESIS REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 20 (2007). 
 22. See, e.g., M CKINSEY & COMPANY, PATHWAYS TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY: 
VERSION 2 OF THE GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT COST CURVE (2009), http:// 
www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/ccsi/pathways_low_carbon_economy.asp (discussing costs 
of climate-change policies); NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE 
CH A N G E (2007), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm (discussing 
economics of climate policy). 
 23. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Emissions Cap Support Wave[r]s among Key 
Democrats, S.F. CHRON., May 14, 2009, at A6 (describing legislative concerns about 
economic impacts of proposed federal climate legislation). 
 24. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT,  SU MMA RY  FO R P OL ICYMA K E RS 19 (2007), av ailable at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf. See also M CKINSEY 
& COMPANY, supra note 22, at 12-14 (discussing the importance of significant near-term 
reductions and the environmental and economic risks of delay). 
 25. See Andreen, supra note 9, at 298 (arguing that state programs should not be 
preempted because “a more plural regulatory system . . . can help mitigate the damage 
caused by possible regulatory and administrative failure at the federal level”); Buzbee, 
supra note 4, at Part IV; LITZ, supra note 6, at 11; Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the 
Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 161, 178-81 
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states are prevented from setting more stringent long-term goals and 
annual caps, then the entire nation is at the mercy of the federal 
government’s potentially misguided judgment. The risk is not remote.  
Several existing trading programs have set insufficiently stringent targets 
that have, in turn, led to over-allocated allowances.26  In some instances, 
the over-allocation resulted in failure; allowances exceeded emissions, 
creating little, if any, incentive for emissions reductions.27  In other 
instances, like the U.S. Acid Rain Program, emissions were reduced to 
some extent but not to the extent readily feasible.28 
Regulatory redundancy is particularly important where government 
entities operate under uncertainty because uncertainty increases the risk 
of erroneous decisions.29  Even if federal targets appear sufficient at the 
outset, they could prove deficient over time as new information about 
the risks of climate change or opportunities for low-cost emission 
(2006); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CLEAN AIR AGENCIES (NACAA), DEFINING THE ROLE OF 
STATES AND LOCALITIES IN FEDERAL GLOBAL WARMING LEGISLATION 11 (June 2008), 
http://www.4cleanair.org/documents/NACAAGWConfProceedingsFINAL060608.pdf. 
See generally Buzbee, supra note 9, at 1590-91, 1594-95 (discussing general importance 
of allowing overlapping state and federal control to provide a state law backup in the 
event of federal agency capture).  As Professor Kirsten Engel has expressed, the states’ 
ability to react to an ineffective federal program is critical; “[p]reemption . . . prevents 
the political process from policing itself.” Engel, supra, at 163. 
 26. See McAllister, supra note 15. 
 27. Allowances exceeded likely “business as usual” (BAU) emissions during the 
first phase of the European Union’s European Trading System (ETS). Id. at 411-12; see 
LARRY PARKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE: THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING 
SCHEME (ETS) GETS READY FOR KYOTO 6 (2007), available at http://fpc.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/92960.pdf.  Estimates differ, however, on what emissions “would 
have been.” Another analysis concludes that emissions in the EU were lower than they 
otherwise would have been. A. DENNY ELLERMAN & PAUL L. JOSKOW, THE EUROPEAN 
UNION’S EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE 34-35 (2008), available at http:// 
www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/EU-ETS-In-Perspective-Report.pdf.  In the RECLAIM 
program, a southern California effort to improve air quality, allowances exceeded likely 
BAU emissions in the program’s early years, dampening emission reduction incentives. 
McAllister, supra note 15, at 412-13, 419-21.  The allowances issued in a Chicago air 
pollution control program consistently exceeded BAU emissions. Id. at 407-08, 411, 419. 
 28. Although the Acid Rain Program has led to significant emissions reductions, 
the program likely failed to achieve reductions that were technologically and economically 
feasible, particularly in its first phase. See McAllister, supra note 15, at 438-39. 
 29. Professors Engel and Adelman observe that environment al regulat ion 
is  developed under conditions of uncertainty and that even well-intentioned legislation or 
regulation routinely fails in light of new developments. David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. 
Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory 
Authority, 92 M INN. L. REV. 1796, 1799-1800 (2008); See Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part 
I(C); see also Buzbee, supra note 9, at 1619 (arguing that it is particularly important to 
allow for state experimentation in new regulatory areas). 
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reductions become available.30  Moreover, regulatory programs, once 
created, risk stagnation as Congress and implementing agencies become 
invested in the status quo.31  Should existing caps prove insufficient, 
states may be more nimble at adjusting their caps than the federal 
government.32 
If states retain the power to respond to federal inadequacy they could 
not only directly make-up for the federal failure but also catalyze 
improved federal legislation.33  As states respond to a federal lapse with 
their own successful initiatives, federal lawmakers could seek to emulate 
state successes at the federal level.  Moreover, impacted industries in the 
more stringent states are likely to lobby for national action that would 
require all states to achieve the same goals, equalizing the playing field. 
There is a significant risk that federal climate policy will fail to set 
emission reduction goals that constitute the United States’ necessary 
contribution to the global effort to avert catastrophic climate change.34  
The political pressures for weak federal economy-wide goals are 
strong.35  While many industries have supported climate-change regulation 
 30. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part I(B); McAllister, supra note 15, at 435-39. 
 31. See Buzbee, supra note 9, at 1494-95; 1608-09 (discussing risk of regulatory 
stagnation in general); Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part IV (discussing risk of stagnation in 
federal climate program). 
 32. See McAllister, supra note 15, at 441 (observing that Congress was unable to 
mobilize to adjust the congressionally set cap for the Acid Rain Program notwithstanding 
evidence that a more stringent cap would be environmentally beneficial and economically 
justified); LITZ, supra note 6, at 11 (describing New York’s adoption of a more stringent 
program in response to the inadequacies of the federal Acid Rain Program). 
 33. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part IV; Engel, supra note 25, at 170-73. 
 34. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part I(A) (stating that the greatest risk of federal 
failure is that federal law will “set[] the cap too high”). Although not without dispute, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has suggested that, to reduce atmospheric 
carbon concentrations to 450 ppm, developed countries must reduce their emissions by 
25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020 and by 80-95% below 1990 levels by 2050. See 
IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: M ITIGATION. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO 
THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE 776 (Bert Metz et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007).  James Hansen, a well-
known atmospheric scientist, has concluded that a sustainable level of carbon concentrations 
is 350 ppm, not 450 ppm, a goal that would necessitate even more radical emissions cuts. 
See James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim? 2 
ATMOS. SCI. J. 217, 228 (2008) available at http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/2008/Target 
CO2_20080407.pdf. 
 35. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part I(A); cf. Cap-and-Trade Charade: The 
Political and Business Self-Interest Behind Carbon Limits, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2007, at 
A8 (observing the intensely political nature of cap-setting and industries’ interest in how 
cap levels will be set).  One scholar notes that political compromise often leads to caps 
that freeze rather than reduce use; environmentalists are satisfied by the freeze, and 
regulated entities are willing to accept the status quo.  See Heinmiller, supra note 2, at 
454. While the fear of climate change is unlikely to lead to a mere freeze in emissions, 
the political dynamic is instructive. 
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and recognize both its necessity and its inevitability,36 the powerful 
fossil fuel industry—including coal, oil, and gas—is likely to perceive a 
climate regime as a significant threat.37 The existing infrastructure serves 
the fossil-fuel industry, and a large workforce relies upon it.38  The 
fossil-fuel industry is concentrated, politically organized, and powerful, 
in contrast to more diffuse and less financially influential environmental 
groups, the just emerging-alternative technology sector, and the future 
generations who will be most impacted by climate change.39  In addition, 
public utilities are likely to be concerned about the costs and implementation 
of strict mandates because some existing utility regulations and rate 
structures create impediments or disincentives to investing in the 
measures necessary to achieve stringent targets—namely, alternative 
energy and energy efficiency.40 
Fundamentally, it is difficult for members of Congress or anyone else 
to ignore the short-term pain that a transition from carbon will likely 
cause, particularly when both the environmental benefits of avoiding 
climate change and the economic benefits of new green technologies are 
remote abstractions that have yet to be realized.41  Moreover, since 
climate-change harms will be unevenly distributed and are likely to be 
most serious outside the United States, many legislators and their 
 36. Many industries have joined the Climate Action Partnership, a collaborative 
industry and nongovernmental organizational effort to advocate for federal climate-
change legislation. See United States Climate Action Partnership Members (2009), 
http://www.us-cap.org/about/members/index.asp. 
 37. See Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global 
Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 214 (2005). 
 38. Terry Dinan, Economic and Budget Issue Brief Trade-Offs in Allocating 
Allowances for CO2 Emissions, 2007 Congressional Budget Office 3, http://www.cbo. 
gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8946/04-25-Cap_Trade.pdf. 
 39. See Lazarus, supra note 21, at 1168 (describing power of entrenched interests); 
id. at 1180-83 (describing why it is more difficult for environmentalists to be politically 
powerful). 
 40. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, Rethinking Reform of Electricity 
Markets, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497 (2005) (describing how electricity regulation 
fails to encourage environmentally sound electricity generation). 
 41. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part I(A); Farber, supra note 14, at 920-21 
(observing that regulation is likely to be “too timid” because it does not adequately 
represent the interests of the future generations likely to suffer the most); Lazarus, supra 
note 21, at 1172 (describing the innate human difficulty in taking action with short-term 
impacts in order to provide long-term benefits); id. at 1179-80 (describing how short 




KASWAN (DO NOT DELETE)  2/15/2016  9:14 AM 
 
constituents may not perceive the requisite urgency for legislation.42  On 
a practical level, the future prospects of carbon-capture-and-storage 
technology could lead Congress to delay significant near-term reduction 
requirements in the hope that the technology will obviate the need to 
transition away from coal.43  The federal government may, therefore, fail 
to set stringent economy-wide, percentage-reduction goals. 
Recently proposed federal legislation provides a case in point.  The 
Waxman-Markey bill establishes an economy-wide goal of reducing 
emissions by 20% below 2005 emissions by 2020.44  In House 
negotiations, however, the bill reduced the percentage of the reduction 
that must come from the sectors covered by the bill’s proposed trading 
program to 17% below 2005 emissions by 2020.45  Both goals fall far 
short of the minimum reductions needed by developed countries to avoid 
substantial climate risks.  Based on scientific assessments of potential 
mitigation scenarios, the IPCC concluded that developed countries 
would have to reduce emissions by 25%-40% below 1990 levels by 
2020 to achieve sustainable atmospheric concentrations of 450 ppm of 
carbon dioxide.46  Since the IPCC used a lower 1990 baseline, not the 
2005 baseline employed by the Waxman-Markey bill, the IPCC calls for 
a much more substantial reduction.  Scientists have recently suggested 
that the 450 ppm goal is not sustainable, and that even deeper reductions 
are necessary to achieve a more sustainable 350 ppm concentration of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide.47  Determining the appropriate target is 
likely to be a politically complex undertaking and this Article is not 
intended to stipulate the “correct” answer.48  The comparison between 
the Waxman-Markey bill and the IPCC’s projections nonetheless reveals 
the risk that federal legislation could prove insufficient. 
 42. See Lazarus, supra note 21, at 1170. 
 43. See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and Carbon 
Sequestration: Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-term Storage of Carbon Dioxide, 
58 EMORY L.J. 103, 115-23 (2008) (describing carbon capture and storage); DAVID J. 
HAYES & JOEL C. BEAUVAIS, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 691, 707-15 
(Michael B. Gerrard, ed. 2007). 
 44. American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 311 
(2009) (establishing Title VII, section 702). 
 45. Id. (establishing Title VII, section 703). 
 46. IN TE RG O VERNMEN TAL P A NEL O N  CLIMATE  CH A N G E , CO N TRIBU TIO N  O F 
WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PANEL OF CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 776 (Bert Metz et al. eds., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2007), available at, http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-
wg3-chapter13.pdf. 
 47. See Hansen et al., supra note 34, at 1. 
 48. See McAllister, supra note 15, at 396; David Driesen, Capping Carbon 15 
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Even if the federal government is willing to establish lofty economy-
wide goals that appear to lead the nation to significant reductions in the 
long term, it may establish short-term annual caps that result in over-
allocated allowances.49 Past trading programs have over-allocated 
allowances, particularly as a program begins, to build industry comfort 
with and support for trading programs.50  Annual caps could also be 
premised upon projected economic growth that fails to materialize.51  If 
growth and associated industrial activity is less than expected, then more 
allowances will be released than are appropriate for the level of 
economic activity, resulting in fewer emissions reductions.52 Another 
risk, borne out in the European Union, is that the annual caps will be 
based upon inaccurate modeling that overestimates existing emissions.53  
While the United States could learn from European missteps, success is 
not assured, particularly given the political pressures that are likely to 
attach to setting annual allowance allocations.54 
Of course, similar political forces and economic concerns could keep 
states from setting sufficiently stringent caps.  But the concentrated 
power of industries opposed to vigorous climate-change legislation is 
 49. See Buzbee, supra note 9, at 1551-52 (observing that “[e]ven if the ultimate 
endpoint cap is sound, the interim steps to get there can be too slow and lax” and that 
“those most directly affected will surely lobby to put off the day when production and 
behavioral changes, and attendant expenses, will have to be confronted . . . “). 
 50. See McAllister, supra note 15, at 414 (describing general issue of overallocation to 
obtain political support); id. at 433 (noting how Illinois designed its allowance allocation 
rules to “make businesses feel comfortable”); id. at 434 (describing how RECLAIM’s 
allowance allocation process included concessions designed to make it “politically 
salable”). 
 51. Policymakers are loathe to take actions that could ultimately constrain growth, 
and are, hence, likely to err on the side of overestimating rather than underestimating 
projected emissions. 
 52. In other trading programs, inaccurate (and optimistic) projections of economic 
growth have led to emissions projections that exceed actual emissions. See McAlllister, 
supra note 15, at 412-13, 433 (describing desire to allow for economic growth as one 
reason for overallocation in the RECLAIM program); LARRY PARKER, CRS REPORT FOR 
CONGRESS, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME (ETS) GETS READY 
FO R K Y O TO  12-13 (2007) (describing s tate desire t o allow for economic growt h 
as  one fact or in s tates ’ setting insufficiently s tringent caps), http://fpc.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/92960.pdf. 
 53. A. DENNY ELLERMAN & PAUL L. JOSKOW, THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EMISSIONS 
TRADING SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE 32 (Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2008), 
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/EU-ETS-In-Perspective-Report.pdf; PARKER, supra 
note 52, at 5-6. 
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unlikely to be as potent in each state as it is in the federal government.55  
The surge in state climate activity to date suggests that at least some 
states will act if the federal government fails to do so.56  That state 
potential could be significant not only in the face of federal inaction but 
also in the face of insufficient federal action.  Moreover, the issue is not 
whether states will act but whether federal law should prevent them from 
doing so.  Skepticism about the states’ willingness to act does not justify 
preempting their capacity to do so. 
C. Democratic Justifications for State Stringency 
The risk of federal failure is not the only justification for allowing 
states to set more stringent caps than the federal government.  The 
determination of where to set long-term reduction goals and annual caps 
requires critical political judgments.57  The states as well as the federal 
government seek the opportunity to express the political views of their 
citizens about the appropriate level of emissions reductions to be 
achieved.58 
Some have argued that state citizens’ political will is less central in the 
context of climate change than in the context of traditional pollutants 
due to the global, rather than local, consequences of GHG emissions.59  
 55. For example, coal industry opposition to climate legislation is likely to be less 
intense in states that do not rely upon coal mining or inexpensive coal power.  One 
potential explanation for California’s relatively aggressive climate-change policy is that 
the state does not depend heavily upon coal-fired power. 
 56. See generally PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, U.S. STATES AND 
REGIONS, http://www.pewclimate.org/states-regions (last visited Oct. 21, 2009) (describing 
state climate-change programs). 
 57. See Heinmiller, supra note 2, at 452-53 (describing the political tensions 
between environmentalists and resource users that arise in cap-setting debates); id. at 455 
(noting that setting caps is not “simply a technical exercise” but “the subject of intense 
political struggle and negotiation by opposing interests”). 
 58. See ANDREEN ET AL., supra note 9, at 8 (describing state and local desire to 
exceed federal minimums to meet constituent demands); id. at 284, 294 (observing that 
states might want to set more stringent caps or deadlines than a federal cap-and-trade 
program); NACAA, Preserving the Rights of the States, in DEFINING THE ROLE OF 
STATES AND LOCALITIES, supra note 25, at 12-13 (observing that many state agency 
officials fear that a national program will be insufficiently stringent and that states will 
seek flexibility in reduction goals and mechanisms for achieving them); see generally, 
Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 M ICH. L. REV. 570, 609-610 
(1996); see Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?  Problems of Federalism in Mandating 
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1210 (1977) 
(describing democratic justification for allowing state environmental decision-making). 
 59. See Andreen, supra note 9, at 288 (describing argument); WHITE PAPER, supra 
note 3, at 11-12 (stating that “[o]ne key distinction between climate change and most 
other environmental problems is that climate change is a global, not local, problem, 
perhaps providing less need for allowing States to be more stringent”).  This argument is 
consistent with the “matching principle,” the principle that the scale of the regulating 
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According to this argument, existing pollution control laws, like the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Clean Water Act, employ a cooperative 
federalist model that allows states to continue to exercise control because 
those statutes, unlike climate-change legislation, address pollution that has 
local consequences.  Although federal law was necessary due to a 
variety of collective action failures,60 the local pollution consequences 
justified giving states continued, overlapping power to control facility 
emissions, particularly under the CAA.61  And even though federal 
environmental legislation was partly motivated by the transboundary 
nature of many environmental harms—a parallel concern in the climate-
change context—that transboundary harm was not exclusive of but, 
rather, in addition to local impacts.  According to this argument, the 
absence of local GHG impacts renders state democratic control 
unnecessary. 
The argument that local or state control is unnecessary because 
climate change is a global problem oversimplifies the issue.  State views 
on the appropriate level of stringency could differ significantly from 
federal judgments.  States’ more stringent commitments could, in some 
cases, be premised on a general concern about the global consequences 
of climate change.62  In other states, the potential local consequences of 
jurisdiction should match the scale of the environmental problem.  See Henry N. Butler & 
Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating 
Federal Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996). 
 60. See Robert  V. Percival,  Environmental Federalism: His tor ical Roots  
and Contemporary Models, 54 M D. L. REV. 1141 (1995) (describing why states failed to 
enact sufficient environmental protection laws, prompting federal action). 
 61. For example, the federal Clean Air Act gives states a central role in making the 
hard choices about how to achieve federal air quality standards.  The federal government 
does establish minimum technology-based standards for all new sources and for existing 
sources in nonattainment areas. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2009) (new source 
performance standards); id. § 7503(a)(2) (establishing requirement that new sources in 
nonattainment areas achieve the lowest achievable emission rate); id. § 7502(c)(a) 
(requiring states to implement reasonably available control technology requirement for 
existing sources in nonattainment areas).  But the states must develop state implementation 
plans that describe how the state will attain National Ambient Air Quality Standards. Id. 
§ 7410(a)(1).  Although the federal government sets minimum technology-based requirements 
for facilities under the federal Clean Water Act, the Act’s requirement that states impose 
controls to meet their water quality standards is likely to give states an increasing role in 
determining facility permitting requirements. Clean Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1313(d) 
(2009) (establishing TMDL process). 
 62. See Engel & Orbach, supra note 12, at 129-30 (describing the desire for a 
“warm glow” as one explanation for state and local climate-change initiatives that 
otherwise appear irrational). States could also seek to attract residents and businesses by 
creating a reputation as an environmentally responsible state. See Barry G. Rabe et al., 
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climate change could prompt an urgency that is not shared in other parts 
of the country, where the predicted impacts are less drastic or more 
uncertain.63 For example, rising sea levels will significantly impact 
coastal states.64  In some parts of the country, increasing temperatures 
will cause dangerous heat waves,65 reduce water supplies,66 and worsen 
local air pollution.67  Changing weather patterns could impact agriculture 
dramatically.68  To be sure, local actions cannot control these impacts; a 
state’s stringency is unlikely, standing alone, to reduce global emissions 
enough to protect the more stringent state.69  But the differential impacts 
within the United States could nonetheless create differing political 
commitments to addressing climate change. Democratic principles 
suggest that citizens should retain the ability to express their stronger 
commitments through more stringent caps. 
The relative costs and benefits of setting stringent caps also vary by 
state and could influence the level of stringency that a state finds 
acceptable.  While climate change may have global causes, climate-
change solutions have local consequences that vary significantly around 
the country.  In some states, GHG reduction policies could provide 
worthwhile economic benefits.70  For example, increasing energy efficiency 
State Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 
20-21 (2005). 
 63. See Andreen, supra note 9, at 289-92 (describing local impacts of climate 
change that give “[m]any states … unique, local reasons to be more protective than the 
federal government”); NACAA, Preserving the Rights of the States, in DEFINING THE 
ROLE OF STATES AND LOCALITIES, supra note 25, at 11; Rabe et al., supra  note 62, at 23-
26 (describing how the perceived risk from climate change has prompted some states to 
act); see generally UNITED STATES GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2009), available at http://downloads. 
globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impact s -rep ort .p df (describing varying 
consequences of climate change around the nation). 
 64. See Andreen, supra note 9, at 290-92; U.S. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH 
PROGRAM, supra note 63, at 149-52. 
 65. U.S. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 63, at 89-91. 
 66. Id. at 41-52. 
 67. See Andreen, supra note 9, at 289-90; U.S. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH 
PROGRAM, supra note 63, at 92-94. 
 68. U.S. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 63, at 71-78. 
 69. See Engel & Orbach, supra note 12, at 120.  A state could, however, set more 
stringent limits in the hope that other states and/or the federal government will follow. 
See id. at 129; Rabe et al., supra note 62, at 23. 
 70. California predicts that implementing its climate change law will produce net 
economic benefits.  See generally CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, CLIMATE CHANGE 
SCOPING PLAN: A FRAMEWORK FOR CHANGE ES-10 to ES-11; 73-79 (2008) [hereinafter 
SCO P IN G P LA N], available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/adopted 
_scoping_plan.pdf; cf. ANDREEN ET AL., supra note 9, at 8-9 (noting state interest in more 
stringent environmental laws to attract green business); NACAA, Preserving the Rights 
of the States, in DEFINING THE ROLE OF STATES AND LOCALITIES, supra note 25, at 11. 
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could lower consumer energy costs71 and reduce reliance on uncertain 
out-of-state or foreign energy supplies.72  States could also find that 
stringent targets enhance incentives to develop green technology in both 
the energy efficiency and the alternative energy sectors, providing new 
economic and job opportunities for the state.73  To the extent that more 
stringent reduction goals lead to greater in-state emission reductions, 
climate-change goals could provide an indirect mechanism for reducing 
associated co-pollutants and improving air quality,74 an important 
objective in states suffering from persistent air pollution. 
Moreover, the potential costs of regulating GHG emissions could vary 
by state. States that do not rely on carbon-intensive energy sources, like 
coal, or that do not rely upon energy-intensive industries are likely to 
weather the transition away from fossil fuels more easily and could be 
more willing to adopt more stringent reduction goals.  For example, 
California’s leadership in adopting comprehensive climate-change legislation 
could have resulted not only from its general political leanings but also 
from the promising economic benefits (through green technology 
development) and relatively low costs (due to the state’s relatively minor 
reliance on coal) of action.  Different cost/benefit balances could thus 
impact states’ relative willingness to adopt stringent targets. 
Federal legislation would, of course, represent the democratic will—
the collective agreement that could be cobbled out among the intense 
interests at stake.  But letting states set more stringent emission reduction 
goals would allow citizens in those states to express political objectives 
that might differ from the “least common denominator” that the federal 
government achieves.75  If federal legislation does not permit states to 
 71. See SCOPING PLAN, supra note 70, at 75 (predicting economic benefits as a 
result of increased energy efficiency). 
 72. See Rabe et al., supra note 62, at 18, 28-32. 
 73. ANDREEN ET AL., supra note 9, at 8-9 (noting state interest in more stringent 
environmental laws to attract green business); SCOPING PLAN, supra note 70, at ES-11; 
Engel & Orbach, supra note 12, at 135; Rabe et al., supra note 62, at 26-28 (observing 
agricult ural opportunities  created by climate policies); id.  at  37-41 (describing 
green technology opportunities); NACAA, PRESERVING THE RIGHT OF STATES, supra 
note 25, at 11. 
 74. See NACAA, Preserving the Rights of the States, in DEFINING THE ROLE OF 
STATES AND LOCALITIES, supra note 25, at 10-12. 
 75. Professor Richard Lazarus argues that the federal lawmaking process creates 
extensive institutional impediments to achieving environmental protection at the federal 
level. See Lazarus, supra note 21, at 1183.  See also Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part I(A) 
(observing that “hardball legislative politics” often results in political compromises that 
fail to achieve scientifically justified outcomes). 
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set more stringent caps, it will prevent states (and their citizens) from 
giving expression to their political views.  As Professor Kirsten Engel has 
explained, preempting state controls would “cut[] short the lawmaking 
process and products of an entire level of democratic government.”76 
The “democratic will” argument raises the question of whether states 
should be allowed to set goals or caps that are less stringent than federal 
goals and caps.77  Some states may perceive fewer benefits because they 
perceive less risk from climate change.  Some states could also perceive 
fewer economic benefits if they are not favorably positioned to develop 
renewable energy or green technologies.  Heavy reliance on carbon-
intensive energy sources or energy-intensive industry could also increase 
the relative costs, or perceived costs, that states face.78 
Notwithstanding potential state opposition to federal standards, 
powerful arguments support requiring states to achieve a federal 
minimum and preventing them from setting a GHG reduction target less 
stringent than the federal target. From a democratic perspective, a  
federal floor could enhance, rather than repress, state democracy.79  
Without a federal minimum, states risk a “race to the bottom” that 
undermines state decision-making.80  A state that would like to maintain 
environmental standards could fear that, if other states go below the 
federal standard, the state with higher environmental standards would 
lose its economic base to the less-regulated state. Notwithstanding the 
desire to protect the environment, the state could feel compelled by 
interstate economic competition to lower its standards.  A federal floor 
would allow a state to achieve at least the federal minimum without 
risking interstate competition. Ironically, a federal floor thus has the 
capacity to serve, rather than frustrate, states’ democratic expression.81  
While a “race to the bottom” is not inevitable, requiring states to abide 
by a federal minimum prevents a destructive race from emerging. 
 76. Engel, supra note 25, at 184. 
 77. See Buzbee, supra note 9, at 1581, 1586.  Some states have strongly resisted 
climate initiatives. See Rabe et al., supra note 62, at 11. 
 78. See Rabe et al., supra note 62, at 11 (noting that regions “dominated by heavy 
manufacturing and dependent on coal power for electricity or coal mining for employment” 
are likely to view climate policy as a threat to the local economy). 
 79. States participating in a conference on the relative role of the federal government 
and the states stressed the importance of minimum federal requirements. NACAA, 
Preserving the Rights of the States, in DEFINING THE ROLE OF STATES AND LOCALITIES,  
supra note 25, at 13. 
 80. See Buzbee, supra note 9, at 1580 (noting important role of federal minimums 
in helping states avoid the race to the bottom); see generally Kirsten H. Engel, State 
Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48 
HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997) (describing race-to-the-bottom); Esty, supra note 58, at 603-
04; Glicksman & Levy, supra note 9, at 597-98; Stewart, supra note 58, at 1211-12. 
 81. See Buzbee, supra note 9, at 1580; Kaswan, supra, note 12, at 799. 
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Conceivably, a state could argue that its desire to set emission 
reduction goals below the federal minimum is not compelled by a race to 
the bottom but accurately reflects its constituents’ balance between 
environmental and economic considerations.82 A federal minimum 
would continue to be justified, however, because collective action 
failures could lead at least some states to impose too low a target.83  
Climate change presents a classic tragedy of the commons.84  States are 
likely to face most of the costs of controlling stationary sources but must 
share the benefits—at least the benefits of reducing GHGs85—with the 
rest of the globe.  As a corollary, since states do not experience all of the 
adverse consequences of their emissions, they are unlikely to take 
sufficient action to control emissions.  Many states’ individual 
cost/benefit analyses are likely to result in less stringent targets than are 
environmentally necessary because the states are unlikely to internalize 
the consequences imposed by their emissions upon other states and 
nations.86  And although some states have found that the potential 
economic benefits of climate-change policies outweigh their costs, that 
calculus will not hold for all states.  Purported economic benefits are 
unlikely to create a sufficient counterweight to the incentives to under-
regulate.  Thus, permitting states to set regulatory targets below 
the federal minimum could seriously undermine the nation’s 
collective effort to reduce emissions. 
 82. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 
‘Race-to-the-Bottom’ Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1210 (1992) (arguing that states set environmental policy by balancing their 
citizens’ preferences for environmental protection and industrial development, and suggesting 
that competition for economic development in the form of differing environmental standards 
is not inherently problematic). 
 83. I and others have described how these collective action impediments justify 
floor preemption.  See Buzbee, supra note 9, at 1580; Glicksman & Levy, supra note 9, 
at 616-17;  Kaswan, supra note 12, at 794-96, 824.  As Professor Richard Stewart has 
stated, “[A] state should not be entitled to invoke the principle of local self-determination 
against federal controls where that state generates significant spillovers which impair the 
corresponding ability of sister states to determine the environmental quality they shall 
enjoy.”  Stewart, supra note 80, at 1227. 
 84. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968) 
(elaborating the challenge of protecting the commons). 
 85. While states would share the benefits of reducing GHGs, they may be able to 
reap ancillary benefits: the economic benefits of promoting alternative energy and energy 
efficiency and the environmental benefits of reducing co-pollutants. See supra notes 70-
74 (discussing benefits of climate-change regulation). 
 86. Engel & Orbach, supra note 12, at 120-21; Rabe et al., supra note 62, at 7. 
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III.  MECHANISMS FOR ACHIEVING MORE STRINGENT CAPS 
Assuming the importance of allowing states to set more stringent 
goals, this section addresses how states would do so.  A critical question 
is the extent to which states could achieve their stringent reduction goals 
by imposing more stringent reduction requirements on sources that are 
within the parameters of a federal cap-and-trade program.  While a state 
could achieve important reductions from changing building codes, 
reducing vehicle-miles-travelled through land-use reforms, or promoting 
renewable energy, states would lose a key tool in the effort to achieve a 
more stringent cap if they could not meet their reduction goals by setting 
a lower annual cap for emissions from facilities within their jurisdiction.  
Moreover, for a state’s more stringent caps to be effective, a state must 
have the ability to prevent facilities in other states from using the “extra” 
allowances that more stringent states generate.  This section outlines 
several potential decentralization forms through which states could 
achieve stringency and retire allowances.  It not only provides a basis for 
visualizing how states could achieve stringency but also lays the 
groundwork for assessing the possible adverse consequences of such 
efforts. 
A.  The Need to Retire Allowances 
A national trading program creates interdependencies that complicate 
a state’s efforts to meet its own goals.  Under traditional environmental 
programs, state efforts to achieve more demanding state emission targets 
impose their primary impact on in-state facilities.87  In contrast, in a 
national trading program, the national allowance market links states 
together so that one state’s actions could have ripple effects throughout 
the entire system. Given these interdependencies, a state cannot effectively 
implement more stringent goals without a mechanism to retire the 
allowances associated with the state’s additional reductions. 
More specifically, the challenge for a state attempting to achieve a 
more stringent cap by limiting sources within a national trading program 
is that any additional reductions achieved within the state by those 
sources would simply free up more allowances for out-of-state sources.  
If out-of-state sources use the extra allowances, that would erase the 
state’s greater stringency.88  For example, using a greatly oversimplified 
 87. Cf. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 9, at 604 (noting that states imposing more 
stringent environmental standards on in-state facilities generally do not cause negative 
external impacts on other states). 
 88. See Andreen, supra note 9, at 294-95; Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part II(C); Farber, 
supra note 14, at 918-19; Glicksman & Levy, supra note 9, at 645; WHITE PAPER, supra 
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hypothetical, assume that a federal cap-and-trade program set a national 
cap of 10,000 tons for the covered sectors and allocated 200 allowances 
to a state’s facilities.  Assume that that state imposed its own cap of 100, 
not 200, tons of emissions—that the state established a cap twice as 
stringent as the federal cap.  Assume further that the state established 
additional requirements on in-state facilities to achieve the more 
stringent state cap.  As a consequence of the state restrictions, in-state 
facilities would use 100 fewer allowances than they received through the 
federal program.  But in a national allowance market, the allowances 
would then simply be available for use by facilities in the other forty-
nine states.  Therefore, the state’s stringency would shift the location of 
the emissions, not reduce them.  State efforts would be futile and 
counter-productive for the stringent state, which would experience the 
additional costs of reducing emissions without generating any GHG 
reduction benefits, in-state or out.  Additionally, in-state sources would 
be disadvantaged relative to out-of-state sources because they would 
face higher emission-reduction costs while out-of-state sources would 
face relatively lower costs, given the greater supply of allowances 
afforded to out-of-state sources by the stringent state’s efforts. 
Unless the federal government or the stringent states retire the 
allowances that make up the difference between the stringent states’ caps 
and the proportion of the federal cap associated with those states’ 
emissions, the stringent states will be unable to achieve more stringent 
caps simply by imposing additional requirements on in-state facilities 
covered by the federal cap.89  The issue of how such allowances could be 
retired, and the impact of that retirement on a state’s sources and on the 
trading system as a whole, is a complicated issue that depends upon the 
mechanism by which the state attempts to achieve its more stringent cap, 
how allowances are retired, and the manner in which federal allowances 
are distributed.  The rest of this Section addresses these questions. 
not e 3, at  15; Kaswan, supra note 12, at 831; LITZ, supra  note 6, at 29; M eghan 
McGuinness & A. Denny Ellerman, The Effects of Interactions Between Federal and 
State Climate Policies, A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., CLEAN AIR: L., POL’Y, 
& PRAC. 175, 199 (2008). 
 89. Cf. Andreen, supra note 9, at 295; Farber, supra note 14, at 918.  Both Andreen and 
Farber note that a state’s more stringent goal could be made effective if the state could 
retire federal allowances in proportion to its expected reductions. 
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B.  Potential Forms of Decentralization 
In order to visualize mechanisms for achieving state stringency and to 
evaluate their potential impacts, it is necessary to first identify the forms 
in which that stringency and associated allowance retirement could be 
realized.  Congress is likely to address the issue of state power within a 
federal trading program in general terms, not just by designing narrow 
provisions to achieve stringency.  I address the following question: given 
differing levels of state power within a federal program, what mechanisms 
could the states use to achieve stringency?  Below, I introduce three 
possible decentralization models that offer states increasing levels of 
control.  Although the models do not contemplate the full array of 
options, they provide a starting point for analysis. 
Mechanisms for achieving stringency and retiring allowances could be 
developed under all three models, and the choice of model does not 
significantly impact the most critical policy issues raised by state 
stringency.90  Nonetheless, the choice of model impacts the mechanisms 
available to the states and the degree to which they must rely upon 
additional federal actions to reach their goals. 
1.   “Light” Decentralization 
The light decentralization model envisions a largely national program, 
but federal legislation would give states the option of setting more 
stringent caps and establishing stationary-source standards that exceed 
federal goals or standards.  The Clean Air Act follows this model; it 
specifically allows states to set both more rigorous air-quality goals and 
more stringent source requirements than those set by the federal 
government.91  As is discussed further below, states could not achieve 
stringency on their own under this model; federal cooperation would be 
necessary to retire allowances. 
 90. While the choice of model does not have significant policy implications for achieving 
stringency, the differences in power afforded the states by each model have very significant 
implications for other features of climate policy.  The choice of a decentralization model 
substantially impacts state control within the trading system.  This Article focuses on the 
issues raised by allowing states to be more stringent; it does not address these additional 
issues.  For a discussion of the issues raised by allowing states to control trading parameters, 
see Kaswan, supra note 10. The choice of model has implications that go well beyond 
determining the mechanisms for achieving stringency. 
 91. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7416.  The climate-change equivalent to allowing 
states to set more rigorous ambient air quality goals would be to allow states to set more 
stringent emission-reduction goals. 
126 
 
KASWAN (DO NOT DELETE)  2/15/2016  9:14 AM 
[VOL. 1:  103, 2009]  Decentralizing Cap-and-Trade? 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE AND ENERGY LAW 
2.  “Medium” Decentralization 
Like the “light” option, the medium decentralization option would 
allow states to set more stringent caps and facility standards.  Unlike the 
light option, it would give states the capacity to achieve stringency 
themselves by giving them the authority to impose restrictions on in-
state facilities’ use of federally distributed allowances.  States could, in 
essence, create a separate compliance program that would require in-
state facilities to comply with state as well as federal requirements.  
States could require facilities to submit federal allowances pursuant to 
state rules.  For example, and as discussed further below, states might 
require facilities to submit extra allowances to the state, or require them 
to submit a higher ratio of federal allowances per ton of emissions in 
order to reach more stringent state reduction goals.  Proposed federal 
legislation at the time of this writing appears to allow this form of 
decentralization.92 
 3.  “Heavy” Decentralization 
The third option would include all the features of light and medium 
decentralization; it would allow states to set more stringent goals and 
standards and allow them to establish state compliance requirements 
(using federal allowances).  It would, however, move substantially 
beyond the previous models.  The federal government would establish 
an emissions budget for all willing states93 and then allow the states to 
distribute the federal allowances within their jurisdiction.  Most large-
 92. Section 334 of the Waxman-Markey bill would amend the Clean Air Act to allow 
states to “cap greenhouse gas emissions, require surrender to the State or a political 
subdivision thereof of emission allowances or offset credits established or issued under 
this Act, and require the use of such allowances or credits as a means of demonstrating 
compliance with requirements established by a State or political subdivision thereof.” 
American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 334 (2009).  A 
parallel bill introduced in the Senate contains the same language.  Clean Energy Jobs and 
American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong., § 124 (2009).  See the following website for 
links to Senate summaries, discussion drafts, guides, and other important and helpful documents: 
PEWClimate.org, The American Clean Air and Security Act (Waxman-Markey Bill), 
http://www.pewclimate.org/acesa (last visited Nov. 7, 2009). 
 93. In the European Trading System (ETS), allowing member states to set their own 
targets apparently contributed to inflated emissions predictions in many states, which in 
turn resulted in over-allocation of allowances in the ETS. See PARKER, supra note 27, at 
5-6.  In order to avoid the risk of states predicting high emissions and therefore generating 
too many allowances, this Article assumes that the federal government, not the states, 
would set the emissions budgets for any states choosing to allocate their own allowances. 
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scale domestic trading programs follow this model, though perhaps by 
necessity rather than choice.94  Proposed federal bills under consideration at 
the time of this writing do not include this option. 
4.  Decentralization Options Not Considered 
This Article does not address the possibility of separate, parallel state 
cap-and-trade programs in which states distribute state allowances for 
in-state trading, at least for the sectors and facilities covered by the 
federal program.95  This Article also assumes that regional trading 
programs, like the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and the Western 
Climate Initiative, would be replaced by nationwide trading.96  I exclude 
these options to create a more manageable set of state/federal dynamics 
and because of the assumption (potentially misplaced) that separate state 
or regional programs would be less politically viable than the forms of 
decentralization suggested in this Article.97  Federal legislation under 
consideration at the time of this writing takes a middle position; it 
creates a moratorium on state and regional cap-and-trade programs for 
five years from the initiation of the federal trading program.98 
 94. Since the federal Clean Air Act gives the states, rather than the federal government, 
control over meeting National Ambient Air Quality Standards, regional trading programs 
to help states achieve the standards have had to give significant authority to the states 
since the federal government lacks the authority to impose its own requirements.  See 
generally Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 685-88 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding the NOx 
Budget Program, a multi-state criteria pollutant trading program, because it left states 
with considerable discretion in how to meet expected emissions reductions). 
 95.  For an analysis of the implications of co-existing state and federal cap-and-
trade programs, see generally McGuinness & Ellerman, supra note 88, at 198-206. 
 96. These regional organizations may continue to operate in order to coordinate 
other regional initiatives, like regional energy development and alternative energy power 
grids, but not to run separate trading programs.  It is possible that regional entities could 
seek to obtain a regional budget for the included states and then follow the regional 
program for distributing allowances among the states.  Since this would add an additional 
layer of administrative effort between federal and state control, it is not clear what 
benefits would flow from this structure.  Nonetheless, the states involved in the regional 
programs are establishing regional parameters and organizing regional auctions that may 
continue to serve useful functions even in a federal program.  For the purposes of this 
Article, however, I will assume that any decentralization would be to the state rather than 
the regional level. 
 97. Trading advocates generally prefer large trading markets in order to maximize 
the number of sources and opportunities for low-cost reductions, to send widespread 
market signals for technology innovation, and to reduce competitive pressures between 
jurisdictions.  See LITZ, supra note 6, at 27. As is evidenced by the movement toward 
regional trading blocks, states are seeking the opportunity to trade beyond state boundaries.  It 
is therefore unlikely that states would want to establish separate statewide cap-and-trade 
programs that allowed only in-state trading.  Similarly, once states have the benefit of 
national trading, they may perceive less need for regional trading. 
 98. American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 335 
(2009) (establishing Title VIII, section 861). 
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C.  Achieving State Stringency Under the Light                            
Decentralization Model 
Under the light decentralization model, which mirrors the savings 
provisions in traditional pollutant control statutes by allowing states to 
set more stringent goals and facility requirements, states could set more 
stringent long-term goals and emissions caps for in-state facilities.  Since 
the light decentralization model would not allow states to control federal 
allowances, state stringency could be effective under this model only if 
federal legislation created additional mechanisms for retiring the extra 
allowances.  States could achieve stringency in two ways: (1) by relying 
exclusively on federal or state allowance retirement or (2) by imposing 
state regulatory emission reduction requirements on in-state facilities 
and having the federal government assist them in retiring the extra 
allowances. 
1.  Achieving State Stringency Solely Through                                 
Allowance Retirement 
Under the light decentralization model, a state could establish more 
stringent goals.  If it wanted to achieve those goals by reducing the 
supply of allowances to its facilities, however, it would have to rely on 
the federal government.  A critical factor for determining how to retire 
the extra allowances is whether the federal government freely distributes 
or instead auctions allowances.  If the federal government freely 
distributed allowances, then federal legislation could require the relevant 
federal agency to assess the state targets, determine how they relate to 
the emissions assumed for the facilities in that state, and distribute 
proportionately fewer allowances to facilities within the more stringent 
state.  The federal government could then retire the leftover allowances 
associated with that state’s facilities.  For example, if the state goal were 
twice as stringent as the federal goal, then the federal government could 
distribute half the expected allocation to the state’s facilities and retire 
the remainder. 
Different mechanisms would be needed if the federal government 
auctioned allowances.  The extra allowances associated with a state’s 
more stringent goal must be withheld from the national allowance pool 
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for the state’s more stringent goal to be effective.99 The federal 
government could reduce the number of allowances to be auctioned in 
proportion to the more stringent state’s emission reduction goals and 
retire them, thereby reducing the national allowance supply.  Alternatively, 
as was proposed in federal legislation in 2008,100 the federal government 
could give states the extra federal allowances associated with their more 
stringent target and permit the states to retire them.  Like direct federal 
retirement of the allowances prior to sale, permitting states to retire 
allowances from the national market would reduce the national allowance 
supply. 
2.  Achieving State Stringency Through State Regulatory              
Requirements Coupled with Allowance Retirement 
Alternatively, under the light decentralization model, states themselves 
could achieve their more stringent goals by imposing direct GHG 
emission reduction requirements, such as efficiency standards or 
production process requirements, on covered facilities.101  If regulatory 
 99. Under the light decentralization model, the state does not have any control over the 
number of allowances their facilities buy from or submit to the federal government.  The 
allowances would therefore have to be taken from the national allowance pool. 
 100. See Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 
3302-03 (2008), available at http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/110/s/s2191rs.pdf; 
LITZ, supra note 6, at 31 (comparing options).  This option is distinct from the heavy 
decentralization model.  In the heavy decentralization model, the states would assume 
full responsibility for allowance allocation within their states.  Under this proposal, in 
contrast, the federal government would remain primarily responsible for allowance allocation 
and only a small percentage of the allowances would be distributed to the states for 
revenue—or stringency—purposes. 
 101. Most of the existing climate policies propose to control industrial sources through 
cap-and-trade programs rather than regulatory approaches.  Proposed federal legislation 
creates a cap-and-trade program for most stationary-source facilities and creates a 
regulatory process only for sources that do not fall within the trading program. See 
generally American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 301-360 
(2009) (establishing cap-and-trade program for most sources). Id. § 331 (establishing 
Title VIII, section 811, requiring regulatory GHG standards for uncapped stationary 
sources).  The Senate discussion draft creates a cap-and-trade program but does not 
eliminate EPA’s authority to establish regulatory standards. Clean Energy Jobs and 
American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 121 (establishing rules for greenhouse gas 
standards that only narrowly preempt source controls under the CAA). The Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative establishes a trading program, not a regulatory approach.  See 
generally Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI Fact Sheet, http://www.rggi.org/ 
docs/RGGI_Executive%20Summary_4.22.09.pdf (Apr. 22, 2009). The Western Climate 
Initiative and the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Accord contemplate trading programs.  
Western Climate Change Initiative, Designing the Program, http://www.westernclimate 
initiative.org/designing-the-program (last visited Sept. 27, 2009) (describing cap-and-
trade as the centerpiece of this regional GHG reduction strategy); M IDWESTERN GOVERNORS 
ASSOCIATION, M IDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS ACCORD 3-4 (2007), available at http:// 
www.midwes t ernaccord.org/midwes t erngreenhousegasreduct ionaccord.p df 
130 
 
KASWAN (DO NOT DELETE)  2/15/2016  9:14 AM 
[VOL. 1:  103, 2009]  Decentralizing Cap-and-Trade? 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE AND ENERGY LAW 
requirements were used to achieve stringency, then the regulated 
facilities would generate fewer emissions than presumed under the 
federal system. 
While state regulations would reduce in-state emissions, they would 
not achieve real stringency unless the extra allowances were retired.  The 
light decentralization model allows the states to impose regulations to 
reduce in-state emissions but does not give them a mechanism for 
retiring extra allowances.  The federal government would have to play 
the same role as it would if the state did not regulate.  If the federal 
government freely distributed allowances, then the federal government 
would have to withhold and retire the extra allowances from the 
regulated facilities in order to keep the facilities from selling their extra 
allowances in the national allowance market.102  If the federal trading 
program instead auctioned allowances, then the federal government 
would have to withhold the additional reductions achieved by state 
regulation from the national allowance pool and either retire them or 
give the extra allowances to the state and let the state retire them.  As is 
discussed further below, while the mechanisms for retiring the 
allowances would be the same whether a state achieved reductions 
through regulation or purely through allowance retirement, the impacts 
on the national allowance market would differ considerably.103 
Thus, under the light decentralization model, states could set more 
stringent goals and annual caps, but federal legislation must create a 
(describing Midwestern states’ intent to create a GHG trading program).  Except for 
certain controls for fugitive emissions and required energy efficiency audits, California 
intends to rely primarily upon a cap-and-trade program to control industrial sources. See 
generally SCOPING PLAN, supra note 70, at 54-56. Nonetheless, if a cap-and-trade program 
proves ineffectual at prompting needed changes, it is conceivable that states would attempt to 
achieve greater results through direct regulation.  In Southern California’s RECLAIM 
program, for example, the local trading program’s failure to induce utilities to adopt pollution 
control technologies led the air district to impose direct regulatory requirements.  See 
McAllister, Beyond Playing “Banker”: The Role of the Regulatory Agency in Emissions 
Trading, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 269, 290 (2007). 
 102. See McGuinness & Ellerman, supra note 88, at 202. 
 103. If a s t at e achieves its s tringency t hrough regulation, t hen mos t  of t he  
reductions will occur within the more stringent state.  As a consequence, retiring the 
allowances will have little impact on the national allowance market because it simply 
accounts for additional reductions that have already occurred.  If allowances are retired 
without in-state regulation, then that reduces the supply of national allowances with no 
assurance t hat t he reduct ions  will occur in t he s t at e wit h t he more s t ringent  
t arget ,  externalizing the impact of the state’s more stringent target.  These consequences 
are discussed further below.  See infra Part IV(B). 
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mechanism for retiring the block of allowances associated with the 
states’ more stringent goals.  In order for states themselves to have the 
power to retire the extra allowances associated with a more stringent 
state cap, they would have to have control over their facilities’ use of 
federal allowances, an option available only under the medium and 
heavy decentralization models.104 
D.  Achieving State Stringency Under the Medium                             
Decentralization Model 
Under the medium decentralization model, a state would have greater 
flexibility in achieving stringency and retiring allowances.  As in the 
light decentralization model, it could adopt regulatory restrictions to 
achieve stringency, but it could exercise control over allowance 
retirement rather than relying on federal action.  In addition, the medium 
decentralization model would give a state the option of using market 
mechanisms, rather than regulatory standards, to achieve greater 
stringency. 
1.  Achieving Stringency by Imposing Regulatory Emissions          
Restrictions and Retiring Allowances 
Under a medium decentralization model, a state could continue to 
achieve its greater stringency through regulatory measures, but it obtains 
additional options for retiring allowances.  As with the light decentralization 
model, the starting assumption is that a state would impose regulatory 
restrictions that reduce in-state facility emissions below the emissions 
levels presumed by the federal government in its allocation process.  If 
the federal government distributes allowances for free, the regulated 
facilities would receive too many allowances.  Letting the facilities sell 
the extra allowances would undermine the state’s effort to achieve 
stringency.  Under a medium decentralization model, a state could 
require the regulated facilities to submit the excess allowances to the 
state for retirement rather than having to rely on the federal government 
to hold back the extra allowances or having the federal government give 
the extra allowances to the state to retire.  Instead of requiring the 
facilities to submit the extra allowances to the state for retirement, the 
 104. See Farber, supra note 14, at 918 (observing that states are likely to want the 
power to control trading in order to effectuate real emission reductions); NACAA, 
Preserving the Rights of the States, in DEFINING THE ROLE OF STATES AND LOCALITIES, 
supra not e 25, at  13 (stating t hat federal legis lation could give states  t he p ower 
t o ret ire allowances from sources within their jurisdiction). 
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same result could be achieved by prohibiting facilities from selling the 
extra allowances.105 
If the federal government auctioned allowances, however, then the 
state regulations would lead regulated facilities to buy fewer allowances 
and the “extra” allowances would remain in the national allowance 
supply.  To retire the extra allowances, the state could require in-state 
facilities to submit federal allowances to the state at a greater than one-
to-one ratio, a ratio that is proportionate to the program’s greater 
stringency.  For example, facilities could be required to reduce emissions 
and then submit, say, 1.25 allowances, as opposed to one allowance for 
every ton of emissions, which would cause facilities to buy more 
allowances on the market than they otherwise would have.106  Under this 
model, a state would achieve greater stringency through regulation but 
retire allowances by controlling its facilities’ use of federal allowances. 
2.  Achieving Stringency Through Market Mechanisms 
Unlike the light decentralization model, the medium decentralization 
model gives states the option of using pure market-based allowance 
submission requirements, without regulation, to achieve more stringent 
goals.  A state could achieve a more stringent annual cap by requiring in-
state facilities to submit to the state a higher ratio of federal allowances 
for each ton of emissions.107 That approach would lead to greater 
 105. Federal legislation would have to make the state power to impose such a restriction 
explicit in order to avoid a preemption or Commerce Clause challenge.  When New York 
State attempted to prohibit in-state facilities from selling allowances to upwind states, 
the courts found that federal law preempted and prohibited the state’s limitations.  See 
Clean Air Mkts. Group v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2003).  Explicit authorization 
of such state restrictions in federal legislation would help protect such state limitations 
from similar challenges.  See Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part III(C) (discussing the risk that 
courts could conclude that federal climate legislation preempts state controls). 
 106. Under this approach, the facilities would bear the cost of retiring the extra 
allowances.  If a state did not want its industry to bear the cost of retiring the allowances, 
then it might prefer to have the federal government withhold allowances from the 
national allowance pool in proportion to the in-state regulatory reductions, an option that 
does not require a state to use the authority given it under the medium decentralization 
model.  The issue of who bears the cost of retiring allowances is likely to be a key 
question in determining the appropriate mechanism.  This Article focuses on federalism 
concerns; the relative burden of retiring allowances on government and industry is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 107. Cf. McGuinness & Ellerman, supra note 88, at 205 (noting that states could 
require in-state source to submit more federal allowances than normally required).  If 
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stringency because each allowance would represent more reductions 
than presumed under the federal program. This approach would 
simultaneously and automatically retire the “extra” allowances from the 
national market, since the facilities would be required to purchase and 
submit the extra allowances associated with the more stringent goal.108  
A state could use this mechanism whether the government distributed 
allowances for free or by auction.109  Since the states that are actively 
addressing climate change have demonstrated a preference for addressing 
stationary sources through market mechanisms rather than direct 
regulatory requirements,110 this mechanism is likely to be attractive to 
the states. 
E. Achieving State Stringency Under the Heavy                         
Decentralization Model 
If the federal government gives states the option of distributing federal 
allowances, achieving a more stringent state program would be more 
straightforward than under the light and medium decentralization 
models.  The federal government would determine the states’ emissions 
budgets and give the states the allowances for in-state distribution.111  
The states could then retire the allowances associated with their more 
stringent goal before distributing or auctioning the allowances to in-state 
facilities.  The states could choose whether or not to couple their 
allowance retirement with direct regulations to achieve stringency. 
  
federal allowances are auctioned rather than distributed for free, these facilities will face 
relatively high costs. 
 108. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 15 n.52 (noting that federal legislation 
could create a mechanism for states to retire allowances by “authorizing States to require 
entities they regulate to turn in Federal allowance as part of the State program”). 
 109. While this option would operate in the same way regardless of whether the federal 
government distributed allowances for free or auctioned, the financial implications for 
affected facilities would differ considerably. 
 110. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (detailing state preference for cap-
and-trade). 
 111. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 15 n.52 (observing that federal legislation 
could create a mechanism for retiring allowances by “allocating Federal allowances to 
States and authorizing them to retire allowances”); LITZ, supra note 6, at 29 (describing 
same scenario); NACAA, Preserving the Rights of the States, in DEFINING THE ROLE OF 
STATES AND LOCALITIES, supra note 25, at 13.  An EPA cap-and-trade program to control 
mercury emissions, since invalidated by the courts, followed the heavy decentralization 
model and allowed states to withhold a portion of the federally distributed budget in 
order to meet a more stringent reduction goal.  See McGuinness & Ellerman, supra note 
88, at 183. 
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F. Conclusion 
The mechanisms states could use to achieve stringency and retire 
allowances differ considerably depending upon the power they are given 
within a federal trading program.  States could set their own targets, and 
impose their own direct emission reduction regulations, under all three 
of the decentralization models discussed above.  But states that prefer 
market mechanisms to regulation could employ market approaches only 
under the medium and heavy decentralization models.112  Moreover, 
states can control the allowance retirement process only under the 
medium and heavy decentralization models; otherwise they must rely 
upon federal retirement of the extra allowances. 
IV.  THE POTENTIAL DRAWBACKS TO ALLOWING GREATER                      
STATE STRINGENCY 
The foregoing analysis provides a basis for assessing the potential 
adverse consequences of allowing states to implement more stringent 
emission reduction targets.  The most significant potential drawback is 
the impact on the national allowance market.  Because a national trading 
program links the states, some of the mechanisms described above could 
impact allowance prices in states that have not chosen to adopt more 
stringent standards. Other drawbacks are ones that have long been 
associated with the nation’s cooperative federalist environmental 
statutes: the potentially higher cost of goods and energy exported by the 
more stringent states, the lack of national uniformity generated by state 
variations, and the administrative inefficiency of overlapping state and 
federal jurisdiction. 
  
 112. As discussed above, under the light decentralization model the states could use 
market mechanisms in coordination with the federal government: the states could set 
their targets and then have the federal government retire the allowances from the national 
allowance supply, indirectly using market mechanisms.  See supra notes 99 to 100 (discussing 
pure allowance retirement option under the light decentralization model).  But the light 
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A.  Impact on the National Allowance Market if                              
Allowances are not Retired 
State efforts to achieve stringency will, by definition, impact the flow 
of allowances and, therefore, impact the national allowance market.  If 
federal legislation does not create mechanisms to retire the excess 
federal allowances associated with more stringent state programs, not 
only will state efforts to be more stringent fail,113 but the extra 
allowances are likely to depress national allowance prices.114  Cheaper is 
not always better.  If allowance prices are too low, then they will not 
create incentives for industries to adopt existing measures to reduce 
emissions.115  Low allowance prices would also fail to create a market 
signal to stimulate technological innovation, since low allowance prices 
will induce facilities to buy allowances rather than new technology.  
Technological innovators are unlikely to invest in research and 
development if low allowance prices will preclude a future market for 
their products.116  In addition, low allowance prices would have little 
impact on energy prices.  As a consequence, they would fail to create 
market signals for lowering consumer energy demand through energy 
efficiency and alternative energy investments.117 
 113. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing how the failure to retire 
allowances would erase a state’s effort to achieve greater stringency). 
 114. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 9, at 645-46 (noting the need to retire the 
allowances associated with more stringent state caps in order to reduce emissions and avoid a 
flood of allowances that could depress allowance values in other states); McGuinness & 
Ellerman, supra note 88, at 199 (observing that more stringent state standards could lead 
to less demand for federal allowances and lower federal allowance prices); id. at 205 
(observing that allowing states to retire federal allowances would prevent states’ more 
stringent programs from depressing national allowance prices).  A federal price floor that 
sets a minimum price for allowances could also address the risk of depressed prices. 
 115. See McAllister, supra note 15, at 419. 
 116. See David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change 
Policies to Induce Technological Change, 50 AZ. L. REV. 835, 850, 853 (2008) (observing 
t hat  t here is  some correlation between increases in energy prices  and t echnology 
innovation); McAllister, supra note 15, at 422.  While low allowance prices are likely to 
dampen technology innovation incentives, high allowance prices do not guarantee innovation 
given the complex range of factors that influence technology innovation decisions. See 
Adelman & Engel, supra at 850, 853-55. 
 117. See M ARILYN A. BROWN ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., SHRINKING THE CARBON 
FOOTPRINT OF M ETROPOLITAN AMERICA 26 (2008) (noting that in the past, energy prices 
lead to less oil consumption).  As with innovation incentives, low energy prices dampen 
incentives for efficiency, but high allowance prices do not guarantee efficiency investments 
due to the complex factors that determine efficiency investments.  See generally Alice Kaswan, 
Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 253, 276-80 (2009) 
(describing why market signals are unlikely to trigger sufficient efficiency investments). 
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B.  Impact on the National Allowance Market if                               
Allowances are Retired 
While retiring allowances is essential to avoid depressing national 
allowance prices, some methods of allowance retirement could cause 
national allowance prices to increase.  This section explores the impacts 
of the mechanisms discussed above.  The choice of decentralization 
model—whether light, medium, or heavy—is critical to determining the 
state’s range of options and its autonomy in exercising them, but the 
choice of model is not the dominant issue in determining the impact on 
the national allowance market.  As is discussed further below, the most 
critical issue is whether the state uses regulation or market mechanisms 
to achieve its more stringent goal.  The discussion below analyzes the 
range of potential impacts, beginning with the options having the least 
impact. 
1. Little Impact: Stringency Achieved by Regulation 
If a state uses regulation to achieve a more stringent annual cap, and 
the state or federal government retires the associated reductions, there 
should be little effect on the national allowance market.  At least in 
theory, under a regulatory approach, all of the extra reductions would be 
made in-state.  The retired allowances represent allowances that the in-
state facilities would have been entitled to (or been expected to  
purchase) but for the additional regulations.  Retiring the allowances 
associated with the stringent state’s extra reductions does not impact the 
pool of allowances presumptively associated with emissions from 
facilities in other states. Assuming that the amount retired matches the 
extra amount reduced, there should be little impact on the supply of 
allowances to facilities in the rest of the nation and, as a consequence, 
little impact on national allowance prices.  The decentralization model 
and mode of allowance retirement would not affect the outcome, since in 
all cases the retired allowances would be associated with in-state 
emission reductions. 
However, two factors could lead to some impact on the national 
allowance market even if regulations lead to in-state emission 
reductions.  The first is leakage.  It is possible that state regulations 
would reduce emissions in-state but, as a consequence, increase out-of-
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state emissions.118  Emissions that appeared to have been reduced would, 
in fact, have simply shifted.  For example, a refinery might meet a state’s 
regulatory requirements by lowering or stopping production, and out-of-
state refineries might increase supply to make up for the reductions in 
the more stringent state. Although in-state refinery emissions would 
decrease, out-of-state refinery emissions would increase.  Retiring the 
allowances associated with the in-state emission reductions would 
remove allowances on the premise that the associated emissions were 
gone, thus reducing the allowance supply available to cover the nation’s 
actual emissions. 
The second factor that could affect whether regulations, coupled with 
allowance retirement, impact the national allowance market is whether 
the more stringent state has a disproportionate number of either high- or 
low-cost reducers.  If the more stringent state contains many low-cost 
reducers who are required to reduce by regulation and whose associated 
allowances are retired, then higher-cost reducers in other states will lose 
the opportunity to purchase allowances that low-cost reducers in the 
more stringent state would otherwise have been allowed to generate for 
profit.  National allowance prices could go up if the market is deprived 
of these low-cost opportunities. 
Conversely, if the more stringent state has high-cost reducers that are 
nonetheless required to reduce emissions pursuant to state regulation, 
then the national demand for allowances could be reduced, since these 
facilities, which might otherwise have purchased allowances, are now 
being required to reduce.  That could slightly lower national allowance 
prices. 
2.  Medium Impact: Stringency Achieved by Market Mechanisms 
Imposed on a Stringent State’s Facilities 
If the federal government or the state uses market mechanisms to 
achieve greater stringency and retire allowances, then most of the impact 
would be felt by in-state facilities but there could be some external 
impact.  As described above, market options include having the federal 
government or the state distribute fewer allowances to facilities in the 
more stringent state or having a state require its facilities to submit more 
federal allowances per unit of emissions.  In order to avoid the cost of 
purchasing allowances, facilities that receive fewer allowances or are 
 118. See generally Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of 
Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961 (2007) (providing detailed analysis of 
leakage risk); Adelman & Engel, supra note 116, at 843-45 (describing leakage risk and 
studies assessing its likelihood). 
138 
 
KASWAN (DO NOT DELETE)  2/15/2016  9:14 AM 
[VOL. 1:  103, 2009]  Decentralizing Cap-and-Trade? 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE AND ENERGY LAW 
required to submit extra allowances will likely reduce emissions by more 
than they would have otherwise.  To the extent they reduce emissions, 
the impact of the state’s more stringent goal will primarily remain in-
state.  If leakage occurs, however, some of the apparent reductions in 
response to the state’s market incentives could lead to increased 
emissions elsewhere, pushing up the demand for allowances.119 
Rather than reducing emissions, facilities subject to market 
mechanisms to achieve greater stringency could choose to purchase more 
allowances.  Such increased demand for allowances would increase 
allowance prices for facilities nationwide.120  In-state facilities would 
still bear the brunt of the state’s stringency because they would have to 
either reduce emissions more or buy more allowances, but this option 
imposes a greater impact on the market than having a state use direct 
regulations to reduce in-state emissions. 
A critical factor in determining the extent of the external impact is the 
proportion of high-cost emission reducers in the state.  High-cost 
emission reducers are more likely to buy allowances than reduce 
emissions.  The greater the number of high-cost reducers, the more the 
state restrictions will lead to allowance purchases rather than in-state 
reductions, and the relatively greater the impact on the national 
allowance market.  A state’s low-cost emissions reducers are more likely 
to reduce emissions rather than buy allowances, so the more low-cost 
reducers in a state, the less the impact on the national allowance market.  
Ultimately, however, it is difficult to predict the extent to which the 
more stringent state’s requirements would lead to in-state reductions 
versus increased allowance purchases.  Hence, it is difficult to predict 
the extent of the out-of-state impact. 
3.  High Impact: Allowances Retired Prior to Auction                              
without State Regulation 
The options with the greatest external impact are those in which the 
federal government or the state retire allowances before they are sold in 
a national auction, unaccompanied by state regulation that would insure 
 119. Cf. supra note 118 and accompanying text (describing how state regulations 
could lead to leakage that results in a shift rather than a reduction in emissions). 
 120. See McGuinness & Ellerman, supra note 88, at 205 (observing that allowing 
states to retire federal allowances “[w]ould . . . effectively reduce the federal cap thereby 
raising the allowance price and costs to all other states”). 
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that the reductions are made by facilities in the more stringent state.  
Retiring allowances prior to auction would reduce the nation’s 
allowance supply and increase allowance prices throughout the nation.  
The impact on out-of-state facilities would be as great as the impact on 
in-state facilities. 
The presence or absence of state regulation plays a critical role in 
determining whether retiring allowances prior to auction will impact the 
national allowance market.  Retiring allowances prior to auction results 
in a high impact only if the state is not achieving its more stringent goal 
through regulation, since retiring allowances prior to a federal auction 
does not impose any particular obligations on the facilities in the more 
stringent state and simply lessens the supply for facilities in all states.  If, 
however, the more stringent state has imposed direct regulations that 
require in-state facilities to make extra reductions in order to meet the 
more stringent state’s goals, then retiring allowances prior to auction 
simply removes the excess allowances, no longer needed in the more 
stringent state, from the market, without affecting the pool of allowances 
available to facilities in all the other states. 
4.  Impacts Organized by Decentralization Model 
State options for achieving stringency are likely to be one consideration 
in a broader debate about state powers within a federal cap-and-trade 
program.  This section therefore organizes the options for—and national 
allowance market impacts of—achieving greater stringency that are 
available under the light, medium, and heavy decentralization models.  
The analysis is intended to help policymakers determine the potential 
implications of achieving stringency under each of the decentralization 
models.  This section does not present new information; it simply 
organizes the analysis presented above by decentralization model. 
 a. Light Decentralization Model 
Table 1 summarizes the national allowance market impacts that could 
result from the retirement mechanisms available under the light 
decentralization model.  Under the light decentralization model, the 
federal government could facilitate the state’s target by distributing 
fewer allowances to facilities in the more stringent state and ensuring 
that the extra allowances are retired.  As noted above, that approach 
would have a “medium” impact, since the in-state facilities would likely 
respond to receiving fewer allowances by both reducing emissions and 
buying allowances in the national allowance market, creating somewhat 
higher allowance prices.  In an auction scenario, the federal government 
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could facilitate a state’s more stringent goal by withholding 
allowances from the national allowance pool and retiring them itself 
or by giving them to the state to retire.  That approach would have a high 
impact since the entire nation would experience the decrease in  
allowances, not just the facilities in the more stringent state. 
TABLE 1                                                                                                                        
LIGHT DECENTRALIZATION MODEL: RETIREMENT MECHANISM 
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In contrast, if a state were to achieve stringency through regulations 
requiring actual reductions from in-state facilities and the extra 
allowances associated with the additional reductions were retired, there 
should be little impact on the national allowance supply (and prices) 
since the regulated facilities would neither demand nor sell any extra 
allowances. 
 b. Medium Decentralization Model 
Table 2 summarizes the national allowance market impacts that could 
result from the retirement mechanisms available under the medium 
decentralization model.  Under the medium decentralization model, 
states could impose their own compliance processes for federal 
allowances.  If a state imposed regulations that required facilities to 
reduce emissions and then required facilities to submit the extra 
allowances they receive to the state, there should again be little impact 
on the availability of national allowances, since the extra reductions and 
the associated allowances are all being accounted for in-state.  The same 
result would obtain if the federal government auctioned allowances and 
the state captured the extra allowances by requiring the regulated 
facilities to submit a higher ratio of allowances per ton of emissions. 
In contrast, if the state did not set regulatory requirements but, instead, 
required facilities to submit more allowances per ton of emissions, then 
the state’s approach to achieving stringency could have a medium impact 
on the market.  While in-state facilities would likely reduce emissions to 
some extent, the enhanced allowance submission requirements are likely 
to lead some facilities to purchase more allowances on the national 
market, reducing supply and increasing prices. 
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TABLE 2                                                                                                                  
MEDIUM DECENTRALIZATION MODEL: RETIREMENT MECHANISM 
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 c.  Heavy Decentralization Model 
Table 3 summarizes the national allowance market impacts that could 
result from the retirement mechanisms available under the heavy 
decentralization model.  Under the heavy decentralization model, in 
which the federal government would give states an emissions budget for 
them to distribute, a state’s use of regulatory versus market measures to 
achieve stringency is, again, key. If the state regulates, and withholds 
allowances in proportion to the regulation, then the state’s efforts should 
have little impact on the national allowance market.  If the state does not 
regulate, however, and simply distributes fewer allowances than are in 
the emissions budget it receives from the federal government, then there 
could be a medium impact on the national allowance market because in-
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state facilities might make up some of the difference by purchasing 
additional allowances from the national market. 
TABLE 3                                                                                                                           
HEAVY DECENTRALIZATION MODEL: RETIREMENT MECHANISM 
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B.  Other External Impacts: Higher Costs Associated with                     
Greater Stringency 
While impacts on the national allowance market are the most novel 
and significant potential consequence of allowing states to set more 
stringent targets, allowance market impacts are not the only potential 
external impact of unilateral state action. Most of the mechanisms for 
achieving stringency described above would impose their primary 
impact on in-state facilities.  Even so, higher in-state costs can 
have indirect impacts on consumers in other states.121  For example, if a 
stringent state imposes more demanding requirements on electricity-
generating units that export electricity out-of-state, out-of-state 
electricity prices could rise.  In addition, more stringent requirements on 
manufacturers could impose higher costs on out-of-state purchasers. 
  
 121. See Andreen, supra note 9, at 294. 
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C.  Uniformity 
A common industry concern with state autonomy is its potential 
impact on national uniformity.122  Differing state caps are likely to lead 
to higher costs and, potentially, differing requirements for facilities in 
the more stringent state in comparison with facilities elsewhere in the 
nation.  The lack of uniformity raises two primary concerns.  The first is 
administrative complexity.  Different requirements in different states 
could complicate compliance efforts for national and multinational 
companies.123  The second, and more significant, concern is equity—the 
creation of an unequal playing field.  Under most of the scenarios 
described above, facilities in more stringent states are likely to incur 
higher costs because they would have to pay for either additional 
emission reductions or additional allowances (with their flexibility to 
choose between these options dependent upon the state’s chosen 
mechanism for achieving a more stringent cap).124  That could place 
facilities in stringent states at a competitive disadvantage in national 
markets.125 
Another potential consequence of non-uniform regulation is that it 
could result in “leakage;” it could prompt facilities or production in 
states with more stringent caps to shift to less heavily regulated states.126  
Leakage would negate a state’s effort to achieve stringency because 
those efforts would simply shift the location of the emissions to a less-
regulated state.  While the more stringent state might meet its own more 
stringent target, that state’s regulation would not have contributed to a 
net drop in emissions. 
 122. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 2 (observing that “[i]ndustry is often 
interested in Federal legislation to avoid or replace a patchwork of State regulations); 
Andreen, supra note 9, at 292-93 (describing argument); DeShazo & Freeman, supra 
note 3, at 1530-31. 
 123. See Andreen, supra note 9, at 292-93 (describing argument). 
 124. If a state required reductions through regulatory measures, facilities would be 
required to incur reduction costs.  If a state imposed market-based requirements, facilities 
could choose whether to meet them through greater reductions or purchasing additional 
allowances. 
 125. See LITZ, supra note 6, at 12 (describing industry concern that state climate change 
policy could create an uneven playing field). 
 126. See generlly Wiener, supra note 118 (providing detailed analysis of leakage risks); 
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D.  Administrative Efficiency 
Governmental administrative efficiency concerns also arise from some 
of the options under which a state could achieve a more stringent cap.127  
If a state establishes regulatory requirements, then facilities would have 
to add greenhouse gas controls into their state permits in addition to 
complying with the federal trading program.  If a state exercises powers 
under the medium decentralization model and requires facilities to 
submit federal allowances to the state, then both state and federal 
administrative resources will be implicated.  Unless federal legislation 
delegates compliance responsibility to the states, facilities would have to 
demonstrate compliance at both the state and federal levels.  In addition, 
unless the federal legislation delegates monitoring and enforcement 
responsibilities to the states, duplicative and inefficient monitoring, 
inspection, and enforcement proceedings could occur. 
V.  BALANCING THE BENEFITS AND THE DRAWBACKS 
Allowing states to be more stringent requires policymakers to consider 
tradeoffs.  This section recapitulates the benefits of allowing states to be 
more stringent and then assesses both the likelihood that allowing states 
to be more stringent would result in adverse impacts and the relative 
severity of the impacts should they occur. 
A.  The Compelling Justifications for Allowing States                                    
to be More Stringent 
As discussed at length above, political realities create a risk that  
federal legislation and implementation will fail to establish long-term 
reduction goals or annual caps that are sufficiently stringent.128  The 
overall goals may fail to sufficiently avert the risk of climate change, the 
pace may be too slow, and political and economic pressures may lead to 
overly generous annual caps.  Even if initial goals and caps appear 
appropriate at the outset, scientific advances in climate science and 
alternative energy may render past goals inappropriate.  While there is 
no guarantee that states will fill the gap, federal legislation should allow 
state regulation to create regulatory redundancy to reduce the risk of one 
monolithic federal failure. 
Furthermore, most federal pollution control laws have long respected 
the nation’s commitment to federalism and permitted state citizens to set 
 127. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 11 (noting that “[m]ore stringent State programs 
might . . . increase the governmental . . . resources needed to achieve the necessary reductions”). 
 128. See discussion supra Part II(B). 
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more stringent environmental goals and standards.  Many states have 
GHG emissions as large or larger than entire nations.129  Precluding 
them from achieving more stringent GHG emission reduction goals 
would significantly interfere with their democratic prerogatives and is 
inappropriate absent a sufficiently compelling justification.  The issue, 
then, is whether the potential adverse impacts of state efforts provide a 
sufficiently compelling justification for preventing states from being 
more stringent. 
B.  Addressing the Potential Adverse Impacts of                                  
Allowing State Stringency 
In determining the potential adverse impacts of allowing states to be 
more stringent, two factors are worth considering: (1) the likelihood that 
states would impose more stringent caps, which affects the extent of the 
projected adverse impacts and (2) if states do set more stringent caps, the 
significance of the impacts. 
1.  States are Unlikely to be More Stringent Unless Greater               
Stringency is Necessary 
As Professor Flatt argues in this Symposium issue, if the federal 
program is sufficiently stringent, then states are unlikely to take more 
aggressive action.130 More stringent caps could impose an economic 
disadvantage on a state’s existing utilities and industries.131  States are 
unlikely to impose such impacts unless the state believes that the 
alternative—the federal system—is unacceptable. 
It is true, notwithstanding the potential economic costs of climate 
policies, that states have been and may continue to enact aggressive 
climate policies in order to reap their economic benefits. But those 
benefits would also flow from a federal cap, so states are unlikely to 
enact more stringent state targets unless the federal government’s cap is 
insufficient to stimulate the hoped-for economic benefits.132 For 
 129. See PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 101: STATE 
ACTION 1 (2009), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Climate101-State-Jan09.pdf. 
 130. See generally Flatt, supra note 3. 
 131. See Flatt, supra note 3, at Part VI. 
 132. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (discussing potential economic 
benefits of climate change policies).  States may well enact climate policies like energy 
efficiency or renewable energy to garner in-state benefits like co-pollutant controls, lower 
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example, California anticipates substantial cost savings from energy 
efficiency.133  These benefits would flow from a stringent federal cap as 
well as from state action; if the federal cap is sufficient, there is no need 
for additional state action.  Similarly, states that hope to lead the nation 
in green technology are unlikely to deem greater in-state stringency 
necessary unless the federal cap is insufficiently stringent to prompt 
green technology investment. 
More stringent state caps do not offer the type of exclusive, 
concentrated benefits to a state that would prompt greater state 
stringency notwithstanding a sufficient federal cap.134  Thus, the primary 
situation in which states are likely to impose more stringent goals is 
when the federal program proves fundamentally weak or ineffective—
precisely the situation in which such state control is most justified. 
Implementation of the Clean Air Act provides a useful example of 
state reluctance to set more stringent goals unless the federal approach is 
palpably inadequate.  Under the Clean Air Act, states retain the authority 
to set more stringent ambient air quality goals and facility standards than 
the minimums required by federal legislation.135  In general, the states 
have not exercised that discretion with regard to ambient air quality 
goals.136  However, when the federal government proposed a trading 
system to control mercury emissions from power plants that would not 
be as protective as the imposition of regulatory controls, many states 
exercised their prerogative and adopted their own approach—more 
stringent direct regulation of mercury sources.137  As Professor Flatt has 
documented, similar state regulation emerged for other hazardous air 
energy costs, or green job promotion.  The policies could result in lowering in-state emissions 
more than projected by the federal program.  The fact that a state might impose measures that 
reduce its emissions more than p rojected by t he federal p rogram does not necessarily  
mean t hat  the state will choose t o enact  a more stringent target.  States seeking these 
economic benefits may not be concerned about the availability of extra allowances in 
other states, as long as they can accomplish their internal objectives.  In other words, the 
incentives for state climate action do not necessarily translate into an incentive for state 
stringency. 
 133. See supra note 71. 
 134. Cf. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 9, at 639-40 (observing that “aggressive 
regulation of GHGs by states and localities cannot produce concentrated environmental 
amenities” and suggesting that states are therefore unlikely to overregulate).  In contrast, 
certain types of state regulation do pose some risk that states would regulate to enhance 
in-s t ate industries.  For examp le, t here is  evidence t hat  s t at es  have imp osed 
fuels  requirements  to enhance in-state fuel refiners.  See Rabe et  al.,  supra not e 
62, at  32-33. 
 135. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006). 
 136. See Flatt, supra note 3, at Part III. 
 137. Steven D. Cook, 23 States Pursuing Stricter Mercury Controls than Required 
Under EPA Clean Air Rules, 37 ENV’T REP. 2381 (2006).  The EPA program the states 
found insufficient has since been invalidated.  New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 583-84 
(D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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pollutants when the federal government was slow to regulate.138  Giving 
states the option of setting more stringent goals and standards is, 
therefore, unlikely to lead to state divergence unless and until the federal 
government fails to develop adequate controls.  The current flurry of 
state climate-change initiatives has arisen in part because of the 
absence of federal requirements.  If the federal government assumes 
the mantle of regulation adequately, states are likely to defer to the 
federal program. 
2.  The Relative Significance of Adverse Impacts 
If states do choose to adopt more stringent targets, a step they are most 
likely to take in the face of federal inadequacy, the question remains: is 
that state action worth its drawbacks?  The impacts on the national 
allowance market present a new challenge to state regulation of 
environmental problems, while most of the other drawbacks, like a lack 
of uniformity and potential administrative redundancies, have long been 
accepted under existing federal environmental laws. 
a.  External Impacts on the National Allowance Market 
When a state imposes external impacts on other states, it causes other 
states to endure a harm over which they have no control.  Other states 
have not had the opportunity to determine whether the harm is worth the 
benefits obtained. Moreover, if states do not experience the full costs of 
their regulation, then they could have an incentive to overregulate.  
Professors Glicksman and Levy state that “[t]he case for displacing state 
regulatory authority is strongest with respect to those areas in which 
each state has incentives to make regulatory decisions that serve the 
state’s own interests while damaging the interests of the collective.”139  
If state regulations lead to internal benefits and external costs, the states 
could regulate more heavily than would be optimal because they are able 
to reap the benefits without experiencing the full costs of their 
 138. See generally Victor B. Flatt, Gasping for Breath: The Administrative Flaws of 
Federal Hazardous Air Pollution Regulation and What We Can Learn from the States, 
34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 107, 122-61 (2007). 
 139. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 9, at 602; WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 23. 
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regulation.140  The policy calculus is more complicated, however, when 
most of the costs are internal and only some of them are external, thus 
weakening the risk of overregulation.  These observations lead to the 
following conclusions. 
i. Allowance Retirement Mechanisms are Necessary to Avoid       
Adverse Impacts on the National Allowance Market 
Since a failure to retire allowances would have a significant external 
impact—depressing national allowance prices—mechanisms to allow 
state stringency must provide a mechanism for retiring allowances.  That 
mechanism is particularly important if a state achieves its greater 
stringency through regulation because regulatory approaches would 
concentrate the reductions in the more stringent state and, accordingly, 
reduce that state’s demand for, and the prices of, national allowances.141 
ii. Achieving State Stringency through Regulation and Associated 
Allowance Retirement is Justified Due to the Minor                               
Impact on the National Allowance Market 
States should be allowed to achieve more stringent goals through 
regulation coupled with allowance retirement since that approach will  
have relatively little impact on the national allowance market.  Under a 
regulatory approach, the extra reductions would be made in the more 
stringent state, and the retired allowances would simply account for the 
state’s reduction in demand.142 
The primary risk is leakage—that state regulations will lead to 
increased emissions (and demand for allowances) outside the state rather 
than truly reducing emissions.  In that case, retiring the associated 
allowances could lead to a shortage of allowances for the true emissions, 
potentially increasing prices.143  However, since leakage would negate 
the effectiveness of a state’s effort to achieve stringency, states are likely 
 140. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 9, at 638 (suggesting that ceiling preemption 
“is not justified unless there are collective action problems that create incentives for 
states to overregulate”). 
 141. A regulatory approach would impose the greatest downward pressure on national 
allowance prices since all of the stringent state’s reductions would occur internally and 
all of the excess allowances would flow out of state.  While a market approach would induce 
facilities to reduce emissions to some extent, the market-based requirements could also induce 
them to purchase additional allowances, decreasing the impact of the state’s stringency 
on the national allowance market. 
 142. See supra Part IV(B)(1) (discussing impact of state regulatory approach). 
 143. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing role of leakage in 
affect ing t he impact of regulat ory  measures  and allowance ret irement  on t he 
nat ional allowance market). 
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to avoid regulatory measures that would result in leakage.  There is little 
point in regulating your own facilities if the emissions will simply pop 
up elsewhere.  Internal self-interest should thus reduce (though not 
eliminate) the threat that state regulations and allowance retirement 
would otherwise pose to the national allowance market.144 
iii. Achieving State Stringency through Market Mechanisms is                
Justified Notwithstanding Some Impact on the                                      
National Allowance Market 
Although the resolution is more difficult, states should also have the 
option of achieving their greater stringency through market mechanisms, 
not just direct regulation.  Such market mechanisms include having 
federal or state governments distribute fewer allowances or having the 
state require facilities to submit more allowances per ton of emissions.  
In those instances, some external impacts on the national allowance 
market could occur if the facilities choose to respond to the enhanced 
requirements by purchasing additional allowances rather than simply 
reducing emissions. 
The benefit of giving states the flexibility to use market measures 
outweighs the potential external impacts.  As I have argued elsewhere, 
regulatory approaches can and should be an important component of 
climate-change policy.145  Nonetheless, most states and the federal 
government are relying principally on market mechanisms rather than 
regulatory approaches to control stationary-source GHG emissions.146  
Industry appears more willing to accept market mechanisms than 
regulatory strategies, creating a greater possibility of political consensus 
around market approaches.147  Government regulators may seek to avoid 
the uncertainty, time, and potential litigation that could be associated 
with regulatory approaches and prefer to simply to set allowance 
 144. St at e self-interest would not  eliminat e t he risk because s t at es  could 
underestimate the leakage that results from their regulations. 
 145. See generally Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic Climate 
Change Policy, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,287, 10,304-05 (2008). 
 146. See supra note 101 (describing current reliance on cap-and-trade). 
 147. See U.S. CLIMATE ACTION PARTNERSHIP, A BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIVE 
ACTION: CONSENSUS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. CLIMATE PROTECTION LEGISLATION 6 
(2009), available at http://www.us-cap .org/pdf/USCAP_Blueprint.pdf; DeShazo & 
Freeman, supra note 3, at 1544. 
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requirements and require facilities to adjust emissions accordingly.148  If 
properly designed, market mechanisms could also create long-term 
transformative incentives that extend beyond the end-of-the-pipe 
approach that most regulations have achieved.149  While this is not the 
place to evaluate the difficult policy choice between regulatory and 
market mechanisms, it is clear that precluding states from achieving 
stringency though market mechanisms would significantly impede state 
policy choices. 
Moreover, while worthy of concern in their own right, the external 
impacts resulting from state market mechanisms are unlikely to generate 
one of the most significant adverse consequences of externalized 
impacts: the risk that a state would overreach when it can externalize the 
consequences of its actions.  Since in-state facilities would experience a 
significantly greater impact than out-of-state facilities, the risk of over-
regulation is low, reducing the potential adverse consequences of the 
external costs.150  Moreover, as discussed above, states are unlikely to 
reap enough sufficiently discrete benefits from more stringent caps to be 
tempted to do so without good cause.151 
In addition, if states set more stringent goals because they believe that 
federal goals are insufficient, they are in fact providing a national 
benefit: helping to avert catastrophic climate change.  Where unilateral 
state action provides external benefits as well as external costs, the 
presence of external benefits helps justify the imposition of external 
costs.  And the risk of states overregulating in order to garner in-state 
benefits is less pronounced where the state is, in effect, sharing the 
benefits of its actions with other states. 
 148. Market advocates critique the relative administrative inefficiency of traditional 
regulatory approaches.  See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming 
Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1342-43 (1985) (describing market-based 
systems as more administratively efficient than regulatory programs).  The assertion is 
not without its critics. See McAllister, supra note 101 (suggesting that trading programs 
are not necessarily more administratively efficient than traditional regulatory programs). 
 149. Market advocates frequently refer to the technology innovation incentives created 
by market mechanisms.  See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 148, at 1336, 1349-
50 (describing innovation incentives). This assertion is also not without its critics.  See, 
e.g., David Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program? Replacing 
the Command-and-Control Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
289 (1998) (suggesting that trading programs do not necessarily promote incentives for 
adopting or developing expensive technology). 
 150. See supra Part IV(B)(2); Butler & Macey, supra note 59, at 47 (noting that 
state restrictions with out-of-state impacts often impose the highest costs on in-state 
consumers, thus limiting the risk of states over-regulating); WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, 
at 23 (suggesting that a state role is appropriate “where a State decides to impose a 
burden on its own citizens and industry without imposing a significant burden outside the 
State”); Kaswan, supra note 12, at 802-03. 
 151. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text. 
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In sum, market measures to achieve stringency are justified 
notwithstanding their potential impact on the national allowance market.  
Forcing states to use regulatory approaches could unduly constrain their 
policy choices.  And the risk of overreaching is mitigated by the internal 
costs that states are likely to experience from their more stringent goals 
and the relatively limited benefits they would obtain from their 
promotion of stringency.  Moreover, the external benefits of allowing 
state stringency mitigate the external costs. 
iv. The Toughest Call: Retiring Allowances from the                               
National Pool without State Regulation 
The most significant external impact on the national allowance market 
arises where allowances are auctioned, the state does not achieve 
stringency through regulation, and the federal or state governments retire 
the allowances associated with the more stringent goals from the 
national allowance pool.  Under that scenario, the national allowance 
pool would be reduced, allowance prices would increase, and the nation 
as a whole would experience the costs of a state’s decision to be more 
stringent. The external costs associated with this mechanism are much 
more significant than for the other mechanisms.  In addition, since the 
adverse impacts of seeking stringency would not be concentrated in the 
more stringent state, the disincentives to overregulation would be 
correspondingly weaker. 
However, as noted above, state efforts to achieve stringency do not 
present as strong a risk of overregulation as other potential forms of state 
regulation.  While a state imposing more stringent limits under this 
approach would not incur state-specific costs, it is also unlikely to 
experience significant economic gains, or at least gains tangible enough 
to prompt such a step, unless the federal program is insufficient.152  
Moreover, as noted above, to the extent more stringent states are making 
 152. Conceivably, a state could take this approach if it hoped to stimulate its green 
technology sector.  But, as suggested earlier, a state is likely to take this step only if the federal 
program is insufficient to stimulate green technology.  In that case, state stringency is 
desirable, even if the state receives some incidental economic benefits from that action.  
In theory, a state could adopt a more stringent GHG program in order to achieve additional 
environment al co-benefit s .  See supra  note 74 and accompanying text (discussing 
environmental co-benefits that could prompt states to set more stringent GHG reduction 
goals).  But a state whose primary interest is in achieving co-pollutant co-benefits would 
be more likely to address co-pollutant regulation directly than to adopt a more stringent 
GHG program solely for that purpose. 
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up for a federal lapse, they are providing an external benefit that 
counterbalances the external costs. 
b.  External Impacts on Out-of-State Consumers 
Although one state’s more stringent requirements on stationary 
sources could result in increases in the price of energy or goods for out-
of-state consumers, that potential impact is a long-accepted consequence 
of allowing states to control in-state sources.153  In addition, as noted 
above, the national benefit of state stringency could compensate for its 
external costs. 
As with impacts on the national allowance market, the risk of more 
generalized external impacts leading to overregulation is less compelling 
for state efforts to achieve more stringent climate-change goals.  That 
risk is dampened by the likelihood that most forms of state stringency 
would impose their primary consequences within the state. Where a state 
imposes cost-increasing requirements on its own facilities, it will be 
accountable to both its manufacturing sector and its consumers.154  The 
risk of over-regulation is thus mitigated by internal political and 
economic pressures. 
The fear of leakage is also likely to prevent states from over-
regulating.  If a state imposes significantly higher standards on its 
electricity or manufacturing sectors and serves a significant out-of-state 
population, then it risks losing its out-of-state customers to other 
electricity sources or manufacturers and shifting, rather than reducing, 
its emissions. 
c.  Uniformity 
Uniformity is a legitimate, but not determinative, concern.155  The 
nation’s existing pollution control statutes have long allowed states to 
impose more stringent goals or facility standards, notwithstanding the 
risk of non-uniformity such state autonomy creates.156  For example, in 
 153. See Andreen, supra note 9, at 294. 
 154. State efforts to achieve stringency are thus less likely to result in potential 
over-regulation than state product standards that control products produced out-of-state. 
 155. See Kaswan, supra note 12, at 802 (stating that “[c]onsistency is an important, 
but not necessarily determinative, factor” in determining the balance between federal and 
state power). 
 156. See Andreen, supra note 9, at 293-94; Glicksman & Levy, supra note 9, at 
616, 635.  As Professors Glicksman and Levy note, “[C]oncerns for uniformity cannot be 
characterized as particularly central to the purposes of the CAA’s regulation of stationary 
sources.” Id. at 636.  Professor Andreen notes that Congress has valued uniformity more 
in the context of product standards than stationary-source standards.  Andreen, supra 
note 9, at 293. 
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the air pollution context, states retain the power to impose more stringent 
air pollution controls on stationary sources,157 and, under Title V of the 
Clean Air Act, the states, not the federal government, generally negotiate 
specific permitting requirements pursuant to federal requirements and 
any more stringent state requirements.158 The Clean Air Act itself 
establishes differentiated facility standards based on a region’s 
attainment status.159  From an administrative standpoint, facilities are 
accustomed to determining additional state requirements.160 
Moreover, market-based mechanisms for achieving stringency would 
impose even less of an administrative burden on industry than differing 
regulatory standards.  In a market-based program, the facility must 
simply determine how many allowances to submit to the state.  It retains 
discretion to determine how to comply with the requirement.  While the 
impacted facilities may seek to avoid the financial costs associated with 
more stringent regulation, the existence of differing allowance 
requirements does not appear to be an overriding administrative obstacle 
to industry. 
For industry, the competitive rather than the administrative impacts of 
a lack of uniformity are likely to be the more significant concern.  
Ultimately, however, the states imposing more stringent reduction 
requirements are responsible for weighing the tradeoffs between 
achieving their environmental goals and adversely impacting certain in-
state industries.  That in-state industries may prefer to avoid the impact 
does not render the state’s democratic choice illegitimate. 
The leakage risk presented by non-uniform standards is an important 
issue for states to consider in determining whether their efforts to 
achieve stringency will be worth it.  But the risk of leakage is not a 
reason to prevent states from being more stringent.  To the extent that 
states fear leakage—fear that the competitive impacts of regulating in-
state sources more stringently will drive industry or production and the 
associated emissions elsewhere—the states are unlikely to impose more 
stringent limits on stationary sources.  While leakage concerns may 
 157. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006). 
 158. See Id. §§ 7661-7661f. 
 159. See supra note 61 (describing different technology-based standards in attainment 
and nonattainment areas). 
 160. See ANDREEN ET AL., supra note 9, at 1, 16 (observing that “[m]ost industries . . . 
have sy stems in place to ensure their compliance with different legal regimes at  
t he international, federal, state, and local levels”). 
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result in relatively few states exercising their autonomy to set more 
stringent targets, they do not justify prohibiting states from exercising 
autonomy where they believe their requirements could be effective. 
Some may argue that the consequences of a lack of uniformity are 
acceptable in the context of traditional pollutants because those 
pollutants have local impacts and states have a particularly strong 
interest in being able to control them further if national emission 
requirements are insufficient.  In other words, the lack of uniformity is 
justified by the importance of state control over local air and water 
quality, an issue not raised by GHG gases.  As discussed above, 
however, powerful arguments for state control over stringency continue 
to justify a potential lack of uniformity even in the absence of direct 
local impacts.  The nation will benefit from a state safety net in the face 
of potential federal failure.  Moreover, states that choose to integrate 
their GHG and co-pollutant reduction strategies could seek to impose 
more stringent requirements on stationary sources in order to maximize 
local, not simply global, benefits.  More broadly, state control over in-
state facilities remains an important state prerogative, a prerogative that 
would be compromised if states were not permitted to establish more 
stringent targets and impose them on in-state stationary facilities. 
 d. Administrative Efficiency 
As discussed above, duplicative federal and state roles create certain 
governmental inefficiencies.  Allowing state control over GHGs would 
not, however, create a brand-new state administrative structure.  The 
Clean Air Act already gives states considerable control over traditional 
pollutants and most facilities receive state-issued permits.161  Duplicative 
federal and state structures already exist.  Allowing state control would 
add GHGs to the list of state-controlled pollutants, not create a new role 
for states. 
In addition, the extent of duplication could be reduced if the federal 
government delegated certain compliance and enforcement functions to 
the states.  While the federal government is likely to maintain control 
over federal compliance submissions, certain inspection, monitoring, and 
enforcement functions could be delegated to states that have met federal 
standards.  That would avoid duplicated state and federal action in these 
areas.  In fact, given limited federal resources and the tradition of state 
 161. See supra notes 157 to 159 and accompanying text (discussing state controls 
under the CAA). 
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monitoring and enforcement of facility emissions, the federal government is 
likely to seek state assistance.162 
While allowing states to set more stringent targets and impose additional 
requirements on in-state facilities could create some duplication and 
require a greater use of collective government resources than would 
occur under a purely federal program, the impact should not be 
overstated in light of existing state administrative structures, and must be 
considered in light of the political and environmental justifications for 
allowing state control.163 
 e. Conclusion 
Most policy choices have trade-offs, and allowing states to set more 
stringent targets and retire the associated allowances is no exception.  
For most (if not all) of the mechanisms for achieving state stringency 
described above, the justifications for allowing state stringency outweigh 
their adverse consequences.  Ultimately, the entire nation would benefit 
from overlapping jurisdiction’s inherent advantages—the greater resilience 
that it offers to federal political failure, to changing circumstances,164 
and as an antidote to regulatory stagnation.165  Moreover, a state’s capacity 
to control in-state facility GHG emissions is an important attribute of 
state power. 
The most significant concern raised by allowing states to seek more 
stringent targets is the potential impact on the national allowance 
market.  On that score, a state’s use of regulatory mechanisms to achieve 
stringency, combined with allowance retirement, is fully acceptable 
since there will be little impact on the national allowance market.  I 
argue that the benefits of allowing state stringency and of giving states 
flexibility in their mechanisms for achieving stringency justify letting 
 162. John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption: 
Lessons from Environmental Regulation, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 220 (1997).  A 
full analysis of the role of the states in monitoring, compliance, and enforcement is an 
area ripe for inquiry but beyond the scope of this Article. 
 163. Glicksman and Levy state that  “the question . . . is” whether the regulatory burdens 
imposed by duplicative federal and state programs justify preempting a state’s ability to 
be more protective, and  “something more than . . . general concerns for regulatory burdens 
should be necessary to warrant ceiling preemption . . .”.  Glicksman & Levy, supra note 
9, at 607. 
 164. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing Adelman and Engel 
arguments). 
 165. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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states use market mechanisms, such as requiring more allowances per 
ton of emissions, notwithstanding some impact on the national allowance 
market.  The mechanisms that would impose the consequences of the 
state’s cap on all states without concentrating the impact in the more 
stringent state—those that retire allowances from the national pool prior 
to auction and in the absence of regulation—present a more significant 
cause for concern.  While that impact should be a relevant factor in 
considering the relative desirability of such mechanisms, the associated 
benefits suggest that this approach should not be ruled out entirely.  The 
other negative attributes of allowing state stringency, including external 
costs resulting from increasing regulation in the more stringent state, a 
lack of uniformity, and the administrative costs of overlapping federal 
and state control, present the same concerns as existing environmental 
statutes, and remain acceptable costs of allowing state autonomy. 
A cooperative federalist model that recognizes the importance of both 
federal and state roles is as appropriate for GHG policy as it is in the 
context of traditional environmental regulation. While the negative 
attributes of state control are not irrelevant and their relative impacts are 
important considerations in policy design, the negative attributes do not 
warrant precluding state stringency. 
VI.  IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
The analysis presented here suggests not only that allowing states to 
be more stringent is justified in the abstract but also that there are a 
number of acceptable mechanisms by which stringency could be  
effectively achieved.  The Article presents the primary federalism 
implications of each mechanism.  Ultimately, however, policymakers 
must consider several additional factors in determining what mechanisms to 
permit within federal legislation.  One important factor in the political 
debate will be the relative burden on industry.166  Another factor will be 
the relative impact on auction revenue.167  The relative administrative 
ease of the alternative mechanisms, whether regulatory or market-based, 
is also a relevant consideration.  These issues are, however, beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 166. For example, some mechanisms, like requiring facilities to submit more than one 
allowance per ton of emissions, impose the cost of retiring allowances on high-cost reducers 
who prefer to purchase allowances rather than reduce emissions.  Other mechanisms, like 
retiring allowances from the pool prior to distribution, would likely have less financial 
impact on covered facilities. 
 167.  Retiring allowances prior to auction is likely to reduce revenue, whereas requiring 
industry to submit additional allowances per ton of emissions would not.  Auction revenue is 
likely to be critical to implementing many important climate-related policies, like investments 
in energy efficiency and alternative technology, adaptation, and international climate assistance. 
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As policymakers consider how to design federal legislation to allow 
state stringency, they are likely to consider the issue in the larger 
context: to what extent should a federal cap-and-trade program devolve 
power to the states?  That is why this Article situates potential mechanisms 
for achieving state stringency within three possible options for decentralized 
power: the light, medium, and heavy decentralization models.  The 
choice of model does not impact whether state stringency could be 
achieved; it could be achieved under all of these models.  The choice of 
model does, however, have a significant impact on a state’s options for 
retiring allowances. 
Under the light decentralization model reflected in existing environmental 
statutes, states could set more stringent general goals and annual caps.  
States could also impose regulatory requirements on in-state sources to 
reduce emissions below the reductions that would have been expected 
under a trading system.  However, whether they regulate directly or not, 
the states would have to rely upon the federal government to either retire 
the extra allowances or give them allowances that they could then 
retire.168  The light decentralization model limits a state’s options for 
achieving stringency and retiring allowances.  Moreover, if the federal 
government auctions allowances and the state does not choose to meet 
its more stringent target through regulation, then the only available 
mechanism for retiring allowances—having the federal government or 
the state withhold them from the national allowance supply—has the 
relatively undesirable impact of imposing the impact on the national 
allowance market as a whole rather than concentrating it within the more 
stringent state.  Thus, if federal legislation calls for allowances to be 
auctioned, the medium or heavy decentralization models could present 
preferable options for retiring allowances. 
Under the medium decentralization model, in which states could 
require in-state facilities to submit federal allowances in an in-state 
compliance process, states could more directly control the allowance 
retirement options.  They could set regulatory standards and then, if the 
 168. As suggested above, if the federal government distributes allowances for free, 
it could distribute fewer allowances to facilities in the more stringent state.  If the federal 
government auctioned allowances and the more stringent state achieved its stringency 
through regulation, the federal government could hold back the associated reductions 
from the national allowance pool. However, if a state does not achieve its stringency 
through regulatory mechanisms and the federal government auctions allowances, then the 
s t at es ’ goals  would have t o be met  by  t he federal government  wit hholding 
allowances  from the national pool prior to auction. 
 159 
 
KASWAN (DO NOT DELETE)  2/15/2016  9:14 AM 
 
federal government freely distributes allowances, require facilities to 
submit their extra allowances to the state. Or, instead of achieving 
stringency through regulatory standards, they could simply require in-
state facilities to submit more federal allowances per ton of emissions, a 
mechanism that would simultaneously achieve greater stringency by 
requiring more emissions per allowance and retire the extra allowances.  
The medium decentralization model clearly offers the states more 
options than the light decentralization model. 
State stringency would be easiest to achieve under the heavy 
decentralization model. Prior to distributing allowances to in-state 
facilities, states could retire the extra reductions from the emissions 
budget received from the federal government. 
Ultimately, federal policymakers will not adopt one or another 
decentralization model based solely upon its implications for state 
stringency. While the options each model presents for achieving 
stringency are relevant factors in the relative desirability of each model, 
many other factors will influence policymakers’ choice of model.  The 
medium decentralization model, which allows states to establish their 
own compliance process, could provide states with a range of powers 
over GHG trading.169  The heavy decentralization model presents a much 
greater devolution of power to the states by allowing them to make the 
critical political and economic decisions about how to allocate 
allowances to in-state facilities in the first place.  The choice of model 
therefore presents issues that are beyond the scope of this Article. 
Although I do not advocate for the adoption of a particular 
decentralization model in this Article, I note that, if federal legislation is 
designed to allow states to be more stringent, the scope of state and 
federal authorities must be explicit.  As Professor Buzbee argues in this 
Symposium volume, entities resisting state control are likely to 
challenge state efforts as preempted, and, unless the federal legislation 
unambiguously allows the type of state control in question, the courts 
could find that the federal legislation impliedly preempts state controls.170 
More specifically, if federal legislation follows a light decentralization 
model, federal legislation would have to create a mechanism for either 
 169. I address some of these powers, including controls on offset use and trading 
controls to maximize co-pollutant reduction benefits, in Kaswan, supra note 10. 
 170. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part VI; Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative 
to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 787-92 (2006) (describing courts’ tendencies to find implicit 
preemption); Robert K. Huffman & Jonathon M. Weisgall, Climate Change and the 
States : Constitutional Issues Ar ising from State Climate Protection Leadership ,  
8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 6, 9 (2008) (stating that courts would likely hold that 
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the federal government to retire associated allowances or the allowances 
to be given to the states to retire, instead of auction.  To enable a 
medium form of decentralization, federal legislation would have to 
explicitly authorize state-imposed restrictions on the use of federal 
allowances or offsets, or the state programs would risk preemption or 
Dormant Commerce Clause challenges.171  To create the heavy 
decentralization model, explicit provisions would have to authorize the 
federal government to set state allowance budgets for participating states 
and create a mechanism for delegating allowance distribution responsibilities 
to the states. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Given the breadth of cap-and-trade programs currently being 
considered, the states’ role in environmental regulation will be 
substantially diminished if they are preempted from setting caps and 
realizing greater stringency through controls on stationary-source  
emissions. Ironically, preserving state power does not undermine 
national well-being; it protects the nation as a whole from the risk of 
federal failure.  With careful attention to detail, Congress can design 
mechanisms that capitalize on the benefits of state action while 
minimizing its drawbacks.  Our system of federalism and the values of 
state control and autonomy that it embodies suggest that Congress 





 171. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at Part III(C) (discussing preemption risk); Farber, 
supra note 15, at 915, 918-19 (arguing that, unless explicitly authorized by Congress, 
state restrictions on federal allowance use by covered facilities will likely be preempted); 
NACAA, Preserving the Rights of the States, in DEFINING THE ROLE OF STATES AND 
LOCALITIES, supra note 25, at 13.  For example, when New York State imposed restrictions 
on in-state facilities’ ability to sell acid rain allowances to facilities in upwind states, the 
2nd Circuit concluded that such restrictions were contrary to, and hence preempted by 
the Clean Air Act.  Clean Air Mkts. Group v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2003).  The 
district court also found that the restrictions violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.  
Clean Air Mkts. Group v. Pataki, 194 F. Supp. 2d 147, 160 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).  A requirement 
that facilities submit “extra” allowances to the state would have the same effect as a 
prohibition on selling them, and could face a similar constitutional challenge.  See Glicksman 
& Levy, supra note 9, at 646. 
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